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Recent studies have documented the impact of institutions and infrastructure development on trade flows. This 
paper studies these issues in the context 010n90in9 trade-related capacity building initiatives and evaluates the 
opportunity cost of different trade-related capacity building policy mixes. Trade-related technical assistance and 
capacity building was recognized in 2001 bythe World Trade Organisation Doha Ministerial Declaration as a core 
element of the development dimension of the multilateral trading system and commitments were set out in those 
areas. The extentof trade-related technical assistance and capacity building to help developing and least-
developed countries participate more efficiently in international trade has increased by 50% between 2001 and 
2004. The purpose of this thesis is to address the question of whether the weights assigned to different 
components of trade-related capacity building in existing trade-related capacity building programmes are 
economically justified. To do this the paper evaluates the opportunity costsof different trade-related capacity 
building policy mixes with specific reference to Sub-Saharan Africa, excluding South Africa. We use a number of 
variables from both theoretical and empirical literature to come up with composite indicators for trade-related 
institutions, infrastructure and human capital. The analysis is also informed by interviews with trade experts in 
Geneva as well as a review of relevant background documents. 
In the empirical analysis we use 2005 trade patterns for a data set of 117 countries of which 24 are in sub-
Saharan Africa. Making use ofa gravity equation augmented with trade-related capacity building variables we run 
a series of Heckman's two-step selection regressions and estimate the marginal impactsof these trade-related 
capacity building indicators on trade as measured by value of total exports. To evaluate opportunity costs. we do 
policy simulations and estimate how much trade flows will be increased under various policy scenarios with 
respect to improved trade-related capacity building indicators in Sub-Saharan Africa. We examine scenarios that 
focus on improved institutions. infrastructure and human capital as they move in the direction of comparability 
with the rest of the world. The world's average level is used as the baseline for each of these composite 
indicators in the policy simulations. The results show that trade flows exhibit different levels of sensitivity to 
different trade-related capacity building policy options with the exporter's infrastructure being the most significant 
with an average elasticity of approximately 3.0. The findings also suggest that complementing improvements in 
the quality of human capital and infrastructure will provide the greatest bilateral trade flow benefit to Sub-Saharan 
Africa; while non-Sub-Saharan Africa countries gain the most from complementing infrastructure and institutions. 
Such a finding contradicts the current focus of ongoing TReB programmes that put emphasis on human capital 
development only. 
Building on both Grossman and Helpman (1991),s trade model and Barro (1990) s' growth model, the paper 
argues that the theoretical propositions are inadequate to address the dynamics associated with trade-related 
capacity buildingpolicy. The paper further argues that analyzing the impact ofrReB using these standard 
frameworks underestimates the impact since policy dynamics are not addressed in that framework. This could 
contribute to explaining why there has not been consensus in the trade-growth empirical literature, wrth some 
authors finding a positive and significant impact of trade on growth, while others argue that the impact is not 
significant Hence, the paper proposes improvements in the specification of the standard growth model to take 
into account policy dynamics, specifically assumptions regarding substitutability among TRee invesbnents. 
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CHAPTER 1 
BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION 
1.1 INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION 
The inception of the Uruguay Round (UR) of multilateral trade negotiations in 1986 and the formation of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO), which came into force on January 1, 1995, transformed 
international trade policy, which is now increasingly determined through multilateral and bilateral 
negotiations and trade agreements. This has made it difficult for developing countries to integrate into the 
world economy due to their inadequate capacities to negotiate, and formulate effective strategies and 
trade policies and also due to their weak institutions. Even though the multilateral trading system offers 
opportunities to developing countries, these countries need to overcome many challenges and problems 
before they can derive maximum benefits from the system. For instance, after Signing the Uruguay 
Agreement in 1994, a number of developing countries realized that some of the obligations they had 
signed on to (e.g., liberalization of access to financial markets, simplification of customs books, etc.) were 
complex and beyond their immediate implementation capacities. The complexity of the issues developing 
countries have to deal with in their participation in the MTS requires that they develop the capacity to 
understand these issues and articulate their interests at negotiation forums. Hence, according to 
Solignac Lecomte (2001:10) 'trade related challenges have become more visible over the last few years' 
as many developing countries, including most of those in the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group, 
have confirmed their lack of resources to meet the challenges of both intemational trade liberalization and 
participation in a multilateral trade system (Solignac Lecomte, 2001). Prominent among the kinds of 
missing resources have been expertise for conducting negotiations and implementing obligations (human 
capital), institutions for overseeing newly required systems of monitoring and enforcement, and 
infrastructure at and around pOints of export and import for inspection, discovery and processing of 
records. 
According to ILEAP (2006), for developing countries to benefit from market access opportunities 
emerging from trade negotiations there should be policy reforms and significant investments in 
infrastructure, training and institutional development. It is not surprising, therefore, that trade-related 
capacity building (TRCB) has increasingly gained the attention of both recipient and donor countries 
(Delin and Vodusek, 2004). There has been an increase in demands for trade related technical 
assistance by developing countries from international agencies and the donor community as evidenced 
by the following requests: 
1 
• The African Trade Ministers, at their meeting in Tunis in 1994, formally requested trade-related 
technical assistance' from the intemational community; 
• In 1999 the Government of Senegal approached the Canadian International Development Agency 
(CIDA) for support in developing a trade and investment strategy; 
• Ghana, also in 1999, requested the UK's assistance in a trade related project; 
• The Indian Ocean Commission asked the European Union (EU) to continue the support granted 
under its Five Year Regional Integrated Trade Development Programme (Solignac Lecomte, 2001); 
• Developing countries insisted that technical assistance for implementation be included in the 
agenda for the Doha Development Round of WTO negotiations launched in 2001. 
While developing countries have been increasingly requesting TRCB, the donor community has also 
been acknowledging the importance of building trade-related capacity in developing countries. Especially 
since Uruguay, donors have been eager to consolidate the multilateral trade system by enhancing 
participation of and stimulating benefits for its poorest members. In support of this policy shift there has 
been a surge in TRCB activities as evidenced by the inception of the following programmes: 
• Joint Integrated Technical Assistance Programmes (JITAP) - This was initiated at the UNCTAD IX 
conference in 1996, in response to the request for technical assistance by African Trade Ministers. 
• Integrated Framework (IF) -This was inaugurated in 1997 and is jointly managed by the WTO, 
UNCTAD, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the International Trade Centre and the 
United Nations Development Programme. 
• European Union Commission (EC) TRCB - Though the EC has been providing technical 
assistance since the 1960s, in 2000 there was a turning point in its focus when trade was identified 
as one of the six priority areas for development policy. 
• Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) -APEC has been a supporter of the WTO and commits 
its members to free and open trade and investment in the region. The majority of its projects are 
managed and funded bilaterally. 
• World Trade Organisation (WTO) - WTO ministers agreed at Singapore in 1996 on a Plan of 
Action for Least Developed Countries. This included technical cooperation to enable them to 
participate better in the multilateral trading system. The WTO mandate to carry out technical 
cooperation activities is provided for in various WTO agreements and decisions. 
• The agenda of the current Round of multilateral trade negotiations. the Doha Development Agenda 
(DDA), devotes significant attention to capacity bUilding2. The emphasis of the DDA is on assisting 
developing countries to integrate fully into the multilateral trading system. In 2001 the Doha 
1 Available at http:Uwww.jitap.org/info-e.htm (accessed 19/02/2009). 
2 World Trade Organisation, Doha Declarations (paragraphs 38, 39, 40 and 41) 
2 
Development Agenda Global Trust Fund was established. It relies on voluntary contributions by 
members to finance technical assistance in trade-related activities. 
The rise ofTRCB as a key element of international integration in least developed countries has posed a 
fundamental challenge to research on the subjects. 
1.2 THESIS OBJECTIVE AND MOTIVATION 
This thesis therefore aims to investigate the opportunity costs of different trade-related capacity building 
(TRCB) policy mixes in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). The thesis follows the WTO/OECD definition ofTRCB 
which includes 'support to: (a) formulate and implement a trade development strategy; (b) increase and 
diversify exports and markets; and (C) participate in institutions and processes that shape national and 
international trade rules and practices' (Weston, Blouin and De Silva, 2005). This definition encompasses 
Trade Policy and Regulations (TPR), and Trade Development (TD)3. Solignac Lecomte (2001:10) 
concisely defined trade capacity development 'as technical and financial assistance granted by donor 
agencies to improve developing countries' capacity to trade internationally'. 
It is well documented in the development literature that Africa not only lags in development compared to 
the rest of the world but is also marginalised from the multilateral trading system (MTS), (Collier, 1995; Ng 
and Yeats,1997). Its share of world exports has declined over the past twenty years from about 4.1 
percent in 1980 to about 1.6% in 2000. At the same time its share of world imports declined from 3.2 
percent to 1.3 percent (IMF's World Economic Outlook). A major challenge for policy makers has been to 
identify possiblemeasures which might rapidly integrate Africa into the mainstream ofthe world economy 
so as to foster growth and reduce poverty. According to Easterly (2001) economists have recommended 
and tried policies that range from foreign financial capital provision to investment in machines; from 
fostering education to controlling population growth; from giving loans conditional on policy reforms to 
giving debt relief conditional on institutional reforms. However none of these policies has delivered as 
promised and some of them have been faced with repeated failures. In the last 25 years expansion of 
trade has become an increasingly important strategiC objective for developing countries and there has 
been a renewed interest in global integration; hence the new focus on TRCB - the broad objectiveof 
whichis tointegrate developing countries into the multilateral trading system. There is a general belief that 
trade provides the best conditions for economic development and growth. Therefore, if a country is not 
well integrated into global economy it becomes marginalised in terms of development and growth. This is 
3 TPR covers support to aid recipients' effective participation in multilateral trade negotiations, analysis and implementation of 
multilateral trade agreements, trade policy mainstreaming and technical standards, trade facilitation including tariff structures and 
customs regimes, support to regional trade arrangements and human resources development in trade. TO covers business 
development and activities aimed at improving the business climate, access to trade finance, and trade promotion in the productive 
sectors (agriculture, forestry, fishing, industry, mining, tourism, services), including at the institutional and enterprise level. (tcbdb 
homepage, available at http://tcbdb.wto.org/publish/2006%20Joint%120Report.pdf, accessed 21/04/2009). 
3 
a main reason for all the interest recently given to trade-related capacity building, also referred to as Aid 
for Trade in the trade policy discussions. 
The 2001 WTO Doha Ministerial Declarations (paragraphs 38, 39, 40, and 41) recognized trade-related 
technical assistance and capacity building as core elements of the development dimension of the 
multilateral trading systemand set out commitments in those areas. Since then, there has been an 
increase in attention to these issues by both recipient and donor countries. This growing interest is 
evidenced by a surge in resources directed towards Trade-Related Capacity Building (TRCB) initiatives, 
though areas of focus differ across donors. Although not generally conceptualized by policy designers in 
these terms, in the categories of recent development theory in economics, these initiatives have generally 
involved investment in one or more of human capital, infrastructure and institution building. As such, 
TRCB is broadly defined as a coherent set of activities by donors and partner countries designed to 
improve trade performance through institutional, human capacity and infrastructural development. 
According to the WTO/OECD Joint Report (2005), since the Doha declaration resources allocated to 
TRCB have increased by 50% (albeit off a very low base). However, despite the increasing importance 
ofTRCB, little research has been done to evaluate the opportunity cost of different TRCB policy mixes. 
Hence, this study is motivated by the need to provide a scientific basis for refining trade-related capacity 
building policy. Sub-Saharan Africa receives special attention in this thesis because its 
underdevelopment compared to the rest of the world and its marginalization from the multilateral trading 
system render it at once the most urgent and the most challenging target for TRCB initiatives. 
However, Collier and Gunnning (1999) argue that Africa's problem of slow growth is due to the influence 
of a few variables measuring environment and institutions. The factors cited as causing slow growth are 
lack of social capital, lack of openness to trade, deficient public services, geographically generated risk, 
lack of financial depth and high aid dependence. The authors argue that social institutions that cause 
growth are underdeveloped in Africa. Collier and Gunning support Rodrik's (1998) argument that the 
decline in Africa's share of world trade reflects Africa's relatively poor economic performance. This 
argument is based on the fact that trade flows as a share of GOP in Africa have risen and are reasonably 
high compared to other countries. If it is true that low economic growth is the source of the main 
constraints on trade in Africa, are true, then a focus on TRCBprograms that facilitate trade may be 
ineffectual. In that case, policies that complement both growth and trade may be preferable. 
The following research questions will be interrogated in detail: Is TRCB policy theoretically and empirically 
informed? Are the weights assigned to different components of trade-related capacity building activities in 
existing TRCB programmes economically justified? To what extent will participation in the MTS be 
enhanced by TRCB? Given the fact that more resources for TRCB imply fewer for other development 
programmes, what is the opportunity cost of investing resources in one particular TRCB approach as 
4 
opposed to another? To adequately investigate these TRCB issues the thesis is organized around the 
following three main themes: 
~ a critical evaluation ofTRCB implementation, choice of instrument and institutional perspective 
ofTRCB; 
~ economic analysis ofthe effects ofTRCB on trade (taking into a=unt opportunity costs) and; 
~ implications of empirical findings for growth models. 
A number of variables from both theoretical and empirical literature are used, to come up with composite 
indicators for trade-related institutions, infrastructure and human capital. For the empirical analysis, the 
thesis makes use of an augmented gravity model to estimate the impact of these TRCB indicators on 
trade as measured by value of total exports. The thesis then estimatespotential increases in trade flows 
under various policy scenarios with respect to improved TRCBcontributions in SSA. In this regard, an 
examination of scenarios that focus on improved institutions, infrastructure and human capacity as they 
move in the direction of comparability with the rest of the world is carried out. The world's average level is 
used as the baseline for each of these composite indicators in policy simulations. 
1.3 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
This section gives a short description of the contents and main results ofthe thesis. It consists of four 
chapters including this Chapter 1, "Background and Introduction", which introduces TRCB issues, 
highlights the objective of the thesis and provides its motivation. 
Chapter 2, "A Critical Evaluation Of Trade-Related Capacity Building Programmes·, establishes a 
background understanding ofTRCB by defining it, analysing its theoretical foundations and giving an 
overview ofTRCB policy papers and other related previous work on infrastructure, institutions and trade. 
The chapter also outlines agency bureaucrats' views on TRCB. In addition, the chapter reviews the 
extent ofTRCB activities by both bilateral and multilateral donors, based on both interview work and desk 
study. The review highlights the fact that there are a wide range of specific TRCB products on offer in 
developing countries and donors do not focus their efforts exclusively on one kind ofTRCB initiative. The 
overview ofTRCB activities in this chapter shows some inconsistencies in institutional response to 
TRCBpriorities. 
Chapter 3, "measuring the opportunity costs of trade-related capacity development in sub-saharan Africa" 
presents economic analysis of the effect ofTRCB on trade and the opportunity costs associated with 
mixes ofTRCB contributions. The data (sources, definitions, and construction ofTRCB indicators) used in 
this thesis are discussed in detail in this chapter. The theoretical foundations ofthe gravity model I will 
use for trade analysis are also discussed. Special attention is given to specification and sample selection 
bias issues, and to how these issues have been addressed in recent empirical literature. The gravity 
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model is estimated using the Heckman two-step selection approach to analyze the marginal effects 
ofTRCB indicators on trade as measured by value of total exports. Regressions are run for different sub-
samples to test different hypothesis and to test the validity of the obtained results. Making use of 
estimated results from the standard gravity equation, the chapter also provides an analysis of different 
TRCB policy mixes and their likely benefits. The impact is examined through simulation of three main 
policy approaches. The main finding of the analysis is that complementarities among objectives matter in 
trade-related capacity building initiatives. More specifically, to get the greatest boost of SSA's bilateral 
trade flows, a policy mix that targets complementary improvement of human capital and infrastructure 
should be adopted. Thus emphasizing human capital development alone (which seem to be the main 
focus of existing TRCB initiatives) at the expense of improvement in infrastructure in SSA will not bring 
about the greatest benefit. Findings from the empirical analysis contradict patterns revealed during the 
critical evaluation ofTRCB programmes in Chapter 2 which showed absence of clear coordination and 
coherence ofTRCB activities necessary for promoting complementarities. What we see is an ad hoc 
implementation of TRBC initiatives by different implementing agencies 
Chapter 4, "implicationsof trade-related capacity building on overall development" uses growth modeling 
to expand the depth of policy relevance of preceding chapters. The chapter tests the implicationsofthe 
preceding findings with respect to impactsofTRCB initiativeson growth, and argues that the standard 
growth models are inadequate to address the dynamics in trade-related policy. Growth modeling is 
introduced to show how complementarities also have a growth impact in addition to a positive impact on 
trade flows (as empirically established in the previous chapter). The thesis then proposes ways of 
extending growth models to take into account the empirical findings in this thesis. The theoretical 
framework is derived from Barro (1990) and forms the basis for the analysis. The chapter concludes that 
analyzing the impact ofTRCB using the standard endogenous growth framework might underestimate the 
impact since policy dynamics are not addressed in the framework - which could be the reason for the 
existence of ambiguities that have been noticed in the trade-growth empirical literature. The chapter also 
presents the final conclusions and policy recommendations, and proposes areas for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
A CRITICAL EVALUATION OF TRADE-RELATED CAPACITY BUILDING PROGRAMMES 
2.0 INTRODUCTION 
Before evaluating opportunity costs ofTRCB, it is necessary to understand what it is, its theoretical 
foundations, the current major programmes that are being implemented and what informs them, and 
implementers' (bureaucrats') views regarding their intended objectives. This chapter will therefore 
critically survey these issues. The chapter is organised as follOWS. Section 2.1 defines TRCB. Section 2.2 
reviews its theoretical foundations. Section 2.3 surveys the empirical literature related to TRCB. Section 
2.4 gives a background analysiS ofTRCB programmes, along with a critical evaluation of the major 
programmes, JITAP and the Integrated Framework. Section 2.5 concludes the chapter by highlighting 
major issues that emerged from interviews with trade officials in Geneva and study of policy documents. 
2.1 DEFINITION OFTRCB 
According to the WTOIOECD,TRCBis defined to include 'support to: a. formulate and implement a trade 
development strategy; b. increase and diversify exports and markets; and c. participate in institutions and 
processes that shape national and international trade rules and practices' (Weston, Blouin and De Silva, 
2005). This definition encompasses Trade Policy and Regulations (TPR), and Trade Development (TD). 
'TPR covers support to aid recipients' effective participation in multilateral trade negotiations, analysis and 
implementation of multilateral trade agreements, trade policy mainstreaming and technical standards, 
trade facilitation including tariff structures and customs regimes, support to regional trade arrangements 
and human resources development in trade. TD covers business development and activities aimed at 
improving the business climate, access to trade finance, and trade promotion in the productive sectors 
(agriculture, forestry, fishing, industry, mining, tourism, services), including at the institutional and 
enterprise level". 
Another term that has dominated trade policy discussion platforms in recent years, which is used 
interchangeably with TRCB, is Aid for Trade (A4T). The WTO Task Force on A4Tdefined it as comprising 
six categories: '(a) trade policy and regulations; (b) trade development; (c) trade-related infrastructure; (d) 
building productive capacity; (e) trade-related adjustment; and (f) other trade-related needs' (OECD, 
2007:7). 
Given that least developed countries, which are the target beneficiaries ofTRCB, are not homogenous in 
terms of development characteristics, their specific TRCB needs differ widely. Effective TRCB efforts 
• (Tcbdb homepage, available at http://tcbdb.wto.org/publish/2006%20Joint%20Report.pdf, accessed 21/0412009) 
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should therefore reflect these differences, and a wide variety of initiatives should ideally be offered. The 
joint WTOIOECD Trade Capacity Building Database (TCBDB), which maintains details and funding levels 
ofTRCB initiatives, lists almost 15000 activities for the period 2001 to 2005, provided by more than 40 
bilateral and multilateral donors. Given this diversity ofTRCB activities it is difficult to come up with one 
common accepted definition ofTRCB, since it means different things to different donors and in different 
recipient countries. Solignac Lecomte (2001:10) concisely defined trade capacity development 'as 
technical and financial assistance granted by donor agencies to improve developing countries' capacity to 
trade internationally'. According to OECD (2001 :22) there seems to be confusion among donors on what 
trade capacity building means, as some donors do not isolate their direct trade capacity building 
programmes from other activities that indirectly affect trade. Furthermore, evolution of new negotiation 
issues means also that trade capacity needs are ever changing (Solignac Lecomte, 2003). 
This thesis categorises all the TRCB activities as a coherent set of activities by donors and partner 
countries designed to improve trade performance through institutional, human capacity and infrastructural 
development. This would be an appropriate definition for taking into account the diverse nature ofTRCB 
activities. Also, implicit in this conception is the idea that partial or piecemeal approaches to TRCB that 
are not coordinated and do not explicitly take into account the importance of policy complementarities will 
fail to stimulate trade or growth. This also goes beyond trade facilitation (which has dominated empirical 
literature in recent years), which focuses on factors affecting mere movement of goods across 
borders. Considering supply-side capacity is in the spirit of the Hong Kong Declaration which recognized 
the need for countries to address supply side capacity and trade-related infrastructure before realizing 
benefits from WTO agreements (WTO, 2005)5. 
2.2 THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OFTRCB 
TRCB issues find their theoretical underpinning in the framework for modelling trade and growth. 
Although most programme documents do not explicitly describe the theoretical basisof their TRCB 
activities, implicitin all initiatives is the demand and supply trade theory, whereby the liberalized 
multilateral trading system is seen as presenting an opportunity (demand) for developing countries to 
expand (supply). Trade capacity development is therefore seen as an instrument through which 
developing countries can increase their ability to supply theincreasing demandoffered by the MTS. 
Over the years, much of the debate on trade and growth has centred on tihe links between trade 
liberalization (openness) and growth and between trade liberalization and income convergence among 
countries. These relationships have been central to development theory and also have long been 
5 Paragraph 57 of the Hong Kong Declaration. 
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recognized in public policy debates. The outward orientation adopted by SSA countries in the 1980s and 
1990s was premised on this widely accepted view that openness was positively linked with grow1h. The 
academic literature gives us a variety of stories about how trade affects grow1h. These stories do not 
contradict each other but they do emphasise different mechanisms. The origins of the theoretical 
literature on trade and grow1h lie in the classical models of absolute and comparative advantage, as well 
as the Hecksher-Ohlin model and its refinements (Jayme 2001). Economists since Adam Smith have 
held, based on both theoretical arguments and empirical measurement, that free trade between any two 
countries is beneficial to both; hence, the idea of economic integration is about exchange or trading for 
mutual benefits in a global economy. Smith argued that if a country specializes in the production and 
exchange of a good in which it has an absolute advantage, that country could benefit by trading with a 
country that has an absolute advantage in the production of something else. The benefits would be that 
both countries could consume more of both goods for the same level of inputs as before trade. 
David Ricardo did not object to Smith's analysis but argued that countries that do not have any absolute 
advantages in productive efficiency can still benefit from free trade. He showed, usinga simple model, that 
total outputs oftwo countries' goods can be increased if both specialize according to their pattems 
of comparative advantage. His argument is that 'trade offers each country the opportunity of specializing 
in the production of the good in which it has the comparative advantage and then exchanging some of 
this production for the good in which it has the comparative disadvantage. Both countries can reallocate 
their labour to the line where their comparative advantage lies, export this good and import the other. In 
short, with a given amount of labour resources each country can consume more by trading than in 
isolation. This possibility is referred to as the gains from trade. The doctrine of comparative costs 
maintains that if trade is left free each country in the long run tends to specialise in the production of and 
to export those commodities in whose production it enjoys a comparative advantage in terms of real cost' 
(Viner: 438). Thus the Ricardian model of trade theory implies product specialisation as a result of 
international productivity differences. 
Hecksher-Ohlin (H-O) extends Ricardo's insight by identifying differences in factor endowments as the 
basis of trade. According to the H-O theorem, in a two-country model each country exports the 
commodity that uses the country's more abundant factor more intensively. 'Theoretically the Hecksher-
Ohlin theorem states that a capital-abundant country exports the capital-intensive good. Its 
generalisation, the Hecksher-Ohlin-Vanek (HOV) theorem, states that a capital-abundant country exports 
capital services' (Trefler 1995: 129). H-O further argued that if trade is determined by differences in 
relative factor endowments, then trade must influence prices of the factors of production. This argument 
led to the Factor-Price-Equalisation Theorem, which states that prices equalize across countries given 
international mobility of factors. Therefore, countries that engage in international trade improve welfare 
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and income, and change the income distribution across countries, by means of a best allocation of factors 
in comparison to autarky (Jayme 2001). 
What could be concluded from these traditional theories of international trade is that international trade is 
the result of differences between countries which give rise to comparative advantage (CEPR, 1994: 16). 
Empirical studies have however, repeatedly rejected the HOV theorem. Some studies have found that 
factor endowments correctly predict only about 50 percent of the direction of factor services trade (Trefler, 
1995). The first serious attempt to test the Hecksher-Ohlin theorem was by Leontief in 1947 and 1951, 
using US trade data. He reached a paradoxical conclusion that the US, the most capital abundant country 
exported labour-intensive commodities and imported capital- intensive commodities. He attributed the 
unexpected findings to the high efficiency of American workers due to superior institutions and economic 
incentives'. This hypothesis led to the emergence of literature seeking to explain it. The simple trade 
theory was complicated by adding factors such as tariffs, human capital, knowledge capital, and 
monopolistic competition (Leamer, 1984: 50-51). 
This discontent with the traditional international trade theories gave rise to other models 'which 
abandoned the toy world of perfect competition and comparative advantage ... to construct the theories 
that acknowledge oligopolies, imperfect competition and economies of scale' (CEPR, 1994: 2). Linder's 
(1961) income hypothesis predicts that trade in manufacturing goods takes place between countries with 
similar demand patterns. Recently, similar arguments have been applied to predict that trade is higher 
between countries with similar institutions, particularly those involving legal and contractual environments, 
relative to that with and between poor countries (Bardhan, 1992: 1). Bardhan further argues that 'these 
institutions through their effects on transaction and production costs affect comparative advantage in 
countries with divergent institutional set-up' (Bard han, 1992: 1) Therefore, according to this 
argumentTrefler (1995) 'missing trade' - that is, trade predicted by traditional models that is not observed 
- finds an explanation in terms of institutional differences between countries, which are directly linked to 
trade costs. 
Other studies have incorporated technological differences among countries in their explanation of trade 
patterns; for instance Trefler (1995)who incorporated factor-augmenting technology into his model. He 
resurrected Leontiefs theory, and showed that when quality indices of factors are incorporated, the US 
exported capital and imported labour services in 1947, as predicted by the HOV Theorem. According to 
Feenstra (1988), technological differences across countries have been found to be important in explaining 
trade in most empirical work. 
·Available at http://www.econ.iastate.eduiclassesJecon355/choVleo.htm. last accessed at [19101120091 
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We now consider how TRCB relates to the existing trade theories and ongoing debates. As noted, 
standard trade models are based on zero transport costs. They make the assumption that the capacity 
exists to structurally change the economy as necessary for optimally engaging in international trade; even 
models that incorporate tariff policies make this assumption. TRCB is potentially relevant because this 
assumption seldom if ever holds: removal of policy barriers to trade does not necessarily increase trade 
flows unless other capacity constraints are removed. Therefore, theoretically, the issue of the relative 
contributions of infrastructure, institutions and human capital development to trade can also find its root in 
the comparative cost argument, in that these reforms increase the productivity of factors of production, 
thus influencing a country's comparative advantage profile. According to Paul Krugman, as Cited in CEPR 
(1994), new trade theories offer opportunities to explain dynamic rather than static sources of 
comparative advantage. 
A cursory overview of various trade theories confirms David and Weinstein (2002),s argument that theory 
and analYSis have so far fallen short of fully specifying the causes and consequences of global trade, as 
important empirical questions remain unanswered. Due to absence of rigorous test of trade theory, policy 
analysiS becomes highly sensitive to the analyst's priors. In line with this search for alternative 
explanations of trade, research on trade costs as measured by geography and a set of national 
differences has also generated a lot of interest recently. The general conclusion has been that trade 
costs also shape the pattern of trade (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003a). It has been noted that actual 
trade is much lower than what a simple gravity model predicts in a frictionless world, motivating Anderson 
and van Wincoop (2003a) to conclude that this diversion gives evidence of the presence of higher trade 
costs which are not related to distance. Based on the empirical work recently going on, there seems to 
be a general consensus that missing trade is mainly due 'to non-tariff barriers to trade, which include 
transport costs, and other costs related to searching for international suppliers or customers, entering into 
contracts and shipping the goods and services'. '(Nordas and Piermartini, 2004: 1 )Therefore, discussions 
on infrastructure, institutions and human capital as determinants of trade find their theoretical justification 
in trade costs issues. Apart from trade costs, these new trade theories bring in other dimenSions of trade, 
such aspatterns and volume of trade, trade diverSification and intra-industry trade among others. One 
such work, is Melitz (2003) which linkstrade and industry structure and performance, and alsofirm 
productivity and trade diversification. The authors argues that, as a result of export market entry 
costs,trade will induce only the more productive firms to enter the export market, while less productive 
firms continue to produce for the domestic market.The paper. goes on sl)ow that further exposureto trade 
reinforces reallocations towards productive firms and results in welfare gains. Thus trade costs affect 
distribution of gains from trade across different types of firms, withonly the efficient ones reaping 
7 Average applied tariffs on industrial products have declined from 15.5 percent in 1990 to 7.9 percent in 2003 
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benefits.Thereffore, the authors find, it is possible to see aggregateindustry benefits of trade without 
seeing any benefit accruing to some individual firms. 
2.3 INSTITUTIONS AND IMPLEMENTATION 
We closely explore TRCB issues in the following sections. This part of the study is based on four months 
spent in Geneva studying WTO documents, attending public official meetings and interviewing (both 
fonmally and informally) officials of some of the international organizations involved in TRCB. (See 
Appendix 1 for a schedule of interviews done.) The main objective of the exercise was to gain a thorough 
understanding ofTRCBinstitutions, implementation mechanisms, and specific policy motivations and 
objectives. The interviews were semi-structured; I developed a guide, which was e-mailed to the 
informants before interviews, to help direct conversations. (See Appendix 2.) The following three sub-
sections give a background analysis ofTRCB programmes, a critical evaluation of the major programmes 
(JITAP and the Integrated Framework), and an overview of specific TRCB activities by major bilateral and 
multilateral donors. Due to the high volume ofTRCB activities my discussion is not comprehensive or 
exhaustive; the purpose of the section is to critically review examples. 
2.3.1 Background Analysis of Trade-Related Capacity Building Programmes 
Any survey ofTRCB literature and interviews will reveal that trade capacity building issues are very 
diverse, complex and broad in coverage, as they mean different things to different donors and recipients. 
As noted before, this is not surprising given that developing countries, which are the focus ofTRCB, are 
far from being homogenous. As such, specific trade capacity needs differ across countries depending on 
a range of factors such as countries' preferences, their level of development, economic factors and social 
infrastructure, among others. Such a diversity of trade capacity needs makes it difficult to come up with a 
single interpretation ofTRCB. This could be reason why the WTOIOECD trade capacity-building 
database records apprOXimately 15000 trade-related activities provided to developing countries from 
2001 to 2005, on both bilateral and multilateral bases (Joint WTOIOECD Report, 2006). These data on 
trade related activities are easily accessible on the joint OECD-WTO TCBDB database 
athttp://tcbdb.wto.org/index.aspx?lg=en&1 
On the other hand, findings from both interviews and review of relevant official documents revealsa clear 
principal broad objective ofTRCB programmes to be that of integrating developing countries into the 
multilateral trading system (Solignac Lecomte, 2001; OECD, 2001; Weston, Blouin and De Silva, 2005; 
WTOIOECD, 2006). In addition, from the discussions with trade policy makers, it would seem that the 
focus of trade related capacity building is almost exclusively on building capacities in negotiating and in 
awareness, processing and use oftrade information. This section of the thesis focuses on critical 
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assessment of existing TRCB activities by both bilateral donors and multilateral agencies to establish an 
appropriate basis for their subsequent economic evaluation. A policy initiative should be assessed partly 
_ though of course not exclusively - by reference to outcomes intended by its architects and 
administrators. Findings from this analysis will also be used to motivate variables and identify proxies for 
TRCBused in the model specification to be estimated in this paper. 
The 2001 WTO Doha Ministerial Declaration recognized trade-related technical assistance and capacity 
building as a core element of development dimension of the multilateral trading system and set out 
commitments in those areas. These commitments are spelled out in the WTO Doha Declarations 
(paragraphs 38, 39, 40, and 41). Since then, the donor community has intensified its efforts to help 
developing and transition countries participate more effectively in intemational trade and integrate into the 
world trading system. According to the Joint WTO/OECD Report, 2006, total commitments ofTRCB by 
donors increased from US$2004.9 million in 2001 to US$2994.6 million in 2004 (excluding commitments 
to infrastructure)". Table 1 below shows total commitments to trade policy and regulations, trade 
development and infrastructure. Infrastructure dominates the volumes ofTRCB commitments in 2005, at 
80% of the total. This should not be surprising partly because infrastructural projects (transport and 
storage, communication and energy) typicallyinvolve largeinvestments(OECD, 2007; WTO, 2006) and all 
infrastructure activities in the WTO/OECD database were categorised as trade-related. There is a 
possibility that failure to take into account and isolate non trade-related infrastructure expenditure would 
result in an overestimation of infrastructure's contribution to TRCB. Activities in the transport and storage 
sector have been dominating assistance to infrastructure, followed by energy and communication 
networks. Assistance to infrastructure, TPR and TO shows average annual grow1h of 4,5%, 2,8% and 
6,0% respectively during the period 2001 to 2005, Marked increase in assistance aimed at TO focuses 
on activities that promote business and trade expansion at both the institutional and enterprise levels -
with some of these activities directly aimed at trade promotion while others have other main objectives 
such as agricultural or industrial development (Joint WTO/OECD Report, 2006:7). By contrast, the sole 
purpose of TPR is trade promotion. 
" For detailed information on the programs, see the Doha Development Agenda, Trade Capacity Building Database 
(http://tcbdb.wlo.org) 
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2004), it contributed to development of relevant human resources and the understanding of trade issues 
in beneficiary countries 12. 
Discussions with key trade officials involved in the implementation of JITAP highlightedthe following 
issues regarding its objectives, design and implementation: 
• The main emphasisef the programme has been on human capital and institutional development at 
both individual and national levels. 
• In response to the question 'Are there some studies which were done before adoption offRCB 
programmes which give an economic justification for such a policy? Are there some implicit economic 
models underlying policy targets?' I was informed that the economic rationale for the programme is 
outlined in the project document JITAP I. However, a critical analysis of this document shows that 
there is no theoretical rationale or justification outlined, apart from reiteration of the fact that JITAP was 
a response to African Ministers' request for capacity building assistance. This finding is important as it 
points to the hypothesis raised in this study, that TRCB were not informed by economic research and 
analysis, but by other factors. 
• Responding to the interview question 'How do you decide on one particular TA activity instead of 
another?' informants indicated that countries identify their needs, which in most cases depended on 
which negotiations were current for them at the time of the question. There is little reason to imagine 
that the order in which trade negotiations occur follows a sequence that has any relationship to what 
economic welfare analysis would recommend. 
Given these findings it is overwhelmingly likely that, where JITAP is concemed, there was little 
consideration of opportunity costs in setting its objectives or allocations. 
\2.3.2.2 Integrated Framework 
The Integrated Framework For Trade-Related Technical Assistance (IF) was set up in 1997 as an 
instrument adopted by the intemational community to strengthen trade and supply-side capacities of 
Least Developed Countries (LDCs). According to UNCTAD (2006) in 2006 IF was extended to 28 
countries, 23 of them from Africa 13, and in 2007 the number increased to 31, with 27 from Africa 14. 
Although, the IF was established in October 1997 it only began operating in 2000.The main objective oflF 
is to help LDCs integrate their trade policies into national development and poverty reduction strategies 
and is jointly managed by the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), UNCTAD, the WTO, 
the ITC and the UNDP. IF aims to ensure that the trade is mainstreamed into national development 
strategies through:creation of domestic awareness of the importance of trade for development; Diagnostic 
"Strategic Review of WTO-provided TRTA Acbvijies, Final Report (!NICOMfDNV/152) 
13 Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, The Gambia, Guinea, Lao POR, lesothO, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Makjives, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nepal, Rwanda, Sao Tome and PrinCipe, Senegal, Sierra leone, 
Tanzania, Uganda, Yemen and Zambia. 
14 Additional countries are Central African Republic, Niger, and Sudan. 
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Trade Integration Studies (OTIS) to identify constraints on trade and technical assistance to countries and 
actionsthat might integrate countries into the global trading system; integrating the programme of action 
into national development plans through the Poverty Reduction Strategy Programmes (PRSPs); and 
implementation of the programme of action in partnership with the development pattems. 
Allocation of resources under IF is through two funding windows, with the first window funding OTIS 
activities and building human resources and Window 2 focusing on funding priority projects identified in 
the OTIS. As such, the main focus of IF has been on human and institutional capacity building done 
mainly through meetings with donor communities at national and regional workshops, where information 
and experiences are exchanged. Funding for IF comes mainly from the LOCs' development partners as 
part of their overall aid for poverty reduction strategies. 
So far OTIS have been completed in 20 countries,followed up by validation workshops. However, it is not 
clear in the current design if IF is the linkage between OTIS national development programmes and other 
TRCB initiatives by donors. How IF work is coordinated with other TRCB activities is not emphasised in 
the design and implementation of IF. The design of IF presupposed local availability of domestic capacity 
(in terms of institutions and expertise) in LOCs to carry out OTIS, integrate it into the PRSP and map 
implementation projects. However, this is contrary to reports from other discussions where capacity 
needs for LOCs have been articulated (WTO Ministerial Conference, 1996; African Trade Ministers' 
Meeting, 1994). The key under OTIS is to have a thorough understanding of prevailing conditions in the 
country and how trade can be integrated in the development process so that poverty reduction objectives 
are achieved. Conditions surrounding policy making in LOCs are highly complex, and the ability to 
influence policy processes in such settings face numerous challenges. Therefore, without the capacity to 
adequately assess the prevailing conditions it might be difficult to come up with OTIS that are meaningful 
for both analytical insights and for policy conclusions. Window 1 of IF makes provision for funding OTIS 
and local structure without upfront funding for capacity development before the actual OTIS. 
2.3.3 TReB Activities by Majnr Bilateral ,mel \1ultilateral Donors 
[ 2.3.3.1 WTO's TRCB Activities 
The WTO's technical assistance and capacity building activities are specifically designed to enhance 
institutional and human capacity in beneficiary countries so as to ensure effective and enhanced 
participation in MTS negotiations and to assist with WTO accession processes. According to the 
Strategic Review of WTO-provided TRTA Activities Report (2006) an annual average of 480 activities has 
been undertaken during 2002 to 2004. Almost half of these have been implemented in Africa, with 19% 
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in Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean receiving 16%. The WTO's Technical Assistance and 
Training Plan outline and prioritise TRTNCB activities based on objectives as identified by beneficiaries. 
Some of the areas covered under the WTO's technical assistance and capacity building objectives are 
notifications, trade policy reviews, dispute settlement management, and general and specialised training 
in trade policy. Activities undertaken by the WTO are coordinated by the Institute for Training and 
Technical Cooperation (IITC) and the Technical Assistance Management Committee (TAMC). The TA 
Plan (2007) groups TA products offered by the WTO under five broad categories: 
(i) General WTO-related Technical Assistance and Training; 
This activity accounts for a third of TRTA budget and is meant for training Government officials who 
are charged with WTO-related responsibilities but are identified as lacking adequate general 
understanding of the WTO's rules and regulations. This training is aimed at exposing participants 
to WTO issues, in particular WTO Agreements and current topics ofnegotiation. The main 
objective is to improve relevant human capital through provision of new information. Tools used to 
implement the activity are Geneva-based Trade Policy Courses (TPCs) and Regional Trade Policy 
Courses (RTPCs); Introduction Courses; Geneva-based Thematic Courses and Regional and Sub-
regional Short Trade Policy Courses (STPCs). 
Trade Policy Courses (TPCs) 
The duration of Trade Policy Courses is 12 weeks. Participants undertake interactive modules, 
attend lectures and selected official WTO meetings, and do exercises and simulations. While 
TPCs and RTPCs share the same objectives and offer similar training opportunities, the RTPCs 
have an institutional development dimension and provide a platform for networking among regional 
peers. 
Introduction Courses 
Introduction Courses and Regional and STPCs are similar to TPCs and RTPCs respectively but are 
of shorter duration (between one and three weeks), and provide general introductory information 
about the WTO such as its rules, functions and agreements. On the other hand Geneva-based 
Thematic Courses usually focus on one group of WTO issues, with a view to identifying what would 
constitute realistically achievable progress in the selected area of negotiations. Thus these shorter 
courses emphasize depth over breadth. The courses are offered in partnership with other 
organizations involved in the area of work. 
(ii) Specialised and Advanced Technical Assistance and Training 
Under this activity training is offered on specific topics for specialists either in Geneva or in the 
field. The programmeconsumes another third of the TRTA budget. Training can be in the form of 
20 
seminars, workshops or specialised courses at either national or regional level or in Geneva. This 
category contains the following sUb-categories of activities: (i) Geneva-based specialized training, 
(ii) national TA activities, (iii) regional seminars and workshops, (iv) advanced training programmes 
for senior government officials, (v) intensive courses on trade negotiations skills and outreach 
activities for Parliamentarians and civil society participants. ITIC organizes these courses and 
partners with other relevant organizations. 
(iii) Academic Support for Training and Capacity Building: An Integrated Approach 
Activities under this category account for 3% of the TRTA budget and include workshops for 
university professors, support programmes for doctoral studies and research collaboration. The aim 
is to build institutional capacities at national levels. Specific tools used range from (i) regional trade 
policy courses, (ii) follow-ups to RTPCs, (iii) workshops for university professors on WTO matters, 
(iv) support programmes for doctoral studies, (v) a programme for visiting academics, and (vi) 
research collaboration, (vii) a document dissemination programme for universities. 
(iv) Support Technical Assistance and Training Facilities 
Under this category of TA, assistance is provided to delegations and beneficiaries both in Geneva 
and in the field, through the following sub-activities: (i) Geneva-based topic-specific symposia, (ii) 
WTO introductory Day, (iii) trainee programmes and intemships and (iv) other forms of Geneva-
based support in the form of Geneva Weekand a newsletter for non-residents, briefing sessions 
through video-conferencing, serving regional groups, and provision ofadvice on legal issues. In the 
field, support includes provision of infrastructure such as a reference centre and print and 
electronic training material. 
(v) E-Learning 
This category makes use of information technology and the internet to widen the number of 
beneficiaries of WTO training material. E-Iearning can be offered either through (i) e-training, 
involving an interactive internet learning environment for government officials from developing and 
least developed Members and Observers; (ii) self-training, through computer-based training 
modules (CSTs) available on the WTO webpage or on CD-ROMS or DVDs or through (iii) briefings, 
which consist of combinations of slide presentations, video files and reference documents all stored 
on one CD-ROM. 
According to WTO officials, technical assistance offered by the organization prior to DDA 2001 was not 
structured, but was mainly demand-driven. The following pointswere highlighted in interviews: 
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• The mandate of the wro to address TA was confirmed at the formation of the 2001 DDA. This 
inclusion of TA under the DDA was introduced as a bargaining tool to encourage developing 
countries to endorse the agenda and permit the Round to be launched. Thus, the motivation for 
this commitment was at least as much political as economic. The events in Seattle during the 3'" 
wro ministerial meeting in 1999 were especially important in this regard. According to one of the 
delegates at the meeting, one of the demands of developing countries, in particular African 
countries was to "secure more technical assistance in meeting stringent wro rules and 
international product standards" through institutionalizing ofTRCB/CB15. Part of their opposition to 
the new ('Singapore') issues which were being raised by the developed countries was the absence 
of capacity to implement wro agreements. Given this background and the absence of an explicit 
policy evaluation, there is a strong basis to argue that the adoption ofTRCB initiative was motivated 
more by politics than economic analysis. The impasse in Seattle had clearly shown developing 
countries' disappointment with the negotiation system. . Therefore they had to be won back to the 
negotiation table; and one such way was through addressing capacity issues. 
• Countries identify their priorities through needs assessments, and then the wro prioritizes 
activities based on the demands of the member countries. It was also noted that the wro does 
not request to see the assessment reports. In this kind of scenario one would expect that 
beneficiary countries are satisfied with TRCB being offered to them; but contrary, sentiments 
expressed by representatives of reCipient countries based in Geneva were that the kind of TA 
being offered is both inappropriate and/or adequate to address the needs of African countries. In 
fact, one representative went further and argued that the TRCB being offered is not the type of TA 
African Trade Ministers requested in Tunis in 1994, and does not address fundamental issues that 
constrain Africa's international integration and growth. If, then, what is on offer is not what was 
requested, what then informs the current design and implementations ofTRCB programmes? 
• wro TA is product driven, though the wro responds to specific country needs that are not 
covered in the TA plan. 
In addition to the five broad TA products/activities the wro, in conjunction with other agencies, is also 
involved in the implementation of JITAP and IF. 
2.3.3.2 United Nations Industrial Development Organisation 
According to the Joint wrO/OECD Report (2006), UNIDO is the largest multilateral provider of TRTAICB 
and it works in partnership with other agencies to ensure that capacity is built for member countries to 
take advantage of trading opportunities. UNIDO aims at enabling developing countries to establish the 
necessary physical and institutional infrastructure that meets the technical requirements of the MTS, so 
"Available at http://www.un.orglecosocdevlgeninfolafreclvoI13n0411wt01.htm. accesses on 2110212009 
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as to increase the share, amount and volume of developing countries' exports (UNIDO, n.d.)'·'n its efforts 
to build this kind of trade-related capacity in developing countries UNIDO has targeted small and medium 
sized enterprises though its '3C's' approach, which focuses on the following three main areas: (i) 
developing competitiveness, (ii) promoting conformity and (iii) enhancing connectivity. A wide range of 
specific activities have been offered by UNIDO, includingdevelopment ofindustrial policyand supportive 
institutional structure, SME development and access to finance, cluster and export consortia 
development, development and harmonisation of standards, certification (ofboth products and enterprise 
systems), upgrading industrial capacity, technology forecasting and diffusion, transfer and investment 
promotion; creation of enabling environments for SMEs, consumer protection, assisting selected 
enterprises to meet ISO 900017, ISO 14000'·, HAGGP'· and other relevant intemational standards and 
Good Manufacturing Practices, and improving productivity, quality and competitiveness. Activities 
implemented by UNIDO are structured in such a way that they address trade facilitation supply 
constraints and market access issues. 
12.3.3.3 Tile World Bank 
One of the key international institutions supporting strengthening of trade-related institutions and 
infrastructure in client countries is the World Bank. According to the Independent Evaluation Group (lEG, 
2006: xiii), between fiscal years 1987 and 2004, about 8.1 percent of total World Bank commitments ($38 
billion) went to 117 countries to help them better integrate into the global economy. According to the 
evaluation, the number of loans devoted to trade-related institutions (primarily customs) accounted for 37 
percent of trade-related lending between 1995 and 1999, making this the Single largest thematic area 
supported (lEG, 2006: 17). The rationale for the Bank's involvement in trade was based onthe importance 
of trade for economic growth and the role of openness in enhancing a country's economic efficiency. 
Areas of focus for the Bank's trade-related support have been trade liberalization, institutional trade 
facilitation (for example, customs), infrastructure-related trade facilitation (such as air freight, ports), 
private and public trade finance, and technical aSSistance for trade negotiations, (lEG, 2006:xiv). The 
evaluation noted that the Bank' trade-relatedassistance has gone through three phases. The first phase 
(1980s -early 1990s) was ultimately deemed to be narrow in focus and based on underestimation of the 
complexities and sequencing of complementary policies. Under pressure from this criticism, the second 
phase,running from mid 1990s to late 19905, saw decline in the Bank's trade support. The third phase .. 
which arose against the background of the collapse of the WTO Seattle Ministerial Meeting in 1999, saw 
the focus shift to research, advocacy, capacity building, and operational activities. Summarising, the 
16 Available:: http·.IIwww.unido.ora/docl25393, accessed 30105/2007. 
17'Intemational Organization for Standardization (ISO) 9000 series of standards has been adopted around the workf for defining and 
documenting quality management systems for organizations of any size and type' 
1a This ISO series deals with the environmental management systems 
" Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point System (HACCP) 
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United Nations , ./ ./ ./ 
Industrial Development 
Organisation (UNIDO) 
United Nations ./ , 
Economic Commission 
j 
for Africa (ECA) 
World Bank ./ , ./ 
International Monetary ./ i 
Fund (IMF) 
United States of : ! ./ ./ ./ America 
Source: Author compilation. 
It is however, worth noting that data recorded under TCBDB might not be comprehensive, as it might not 
include all aid flows supporting human capital, institutions and infrastructure. Future researchshould look 
at the TRCB in the broader context of DAC statistics, which measure official and private flows from DAC 
donors, multilateral organisations and other sources. 
2.4 RELATED EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
Lack of trade capacity has been singled out by the international community as one of the key 
impediments to development, as shown by the emphasis of the Doha Ministerial declaration on the 
central role ofTRCB (Piazza and Sdralevich, 2004). TRCB has concentrated on three main facets which 
are human capital and institutional development (in the form of regulatory reform) and infrastructural 
capacity development. Policy variants are mainly distinguished by placing different levels of relative 
emphasis on these three targets. 
Even though TRCB issues have rapidly gained prominence in trade policy circles, empirical work in the 
area is still quite limited. However, there has been work in related strands of economic literature, such as 
studies of the effects of infrastructure on trade, oftrade facilitation on trade, andof effects of institutions 
and regulatory reform on trade. In addition, there have been a number of discussions, policy and seminar 
papers written on TRCB activities, though with a noticeable absence of analytical academic studies 
evaluating their effectiveness or opportunity costs. Available empirical literature lacks insight on the 
impact of trade-related technical assistance offered by different donor agencies; the present thesis is an 
attempt to fill this gap. In this section I will provide anoverview of such limited policy assessment literature 
as exists. 
12.4.1 An Overview ofTRCB Policy papers 
Renewed interest in TRCB issues has resulted in an increasing number of donors publishing guidelines 
for strengthening trade capacity development. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
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Development (OECD) published such guidelines in 2001, drawing heavily on case studies of capacity 
building efforts in EI Salvador, Ghana, Senegal and Vietnam. The OECD report (OECD, 2001) focused 
on capacity building to enhance developing countries' participation in the MTS through the WTO. The 
OECD guidelines noted the complexity of trade issues, and hence urged the need to address capacity 
gaps in a wide range of areas. The main contribution of the guidelines to the TRCB debate is that, 'they 
provide overall policy guidance and a common reference point for trade aid and finance communities on 
capacity development for trade, putting trade capacity building in the context of comprehensive 
approaches to development and poverty reduction' (OECD, 2001: 17). 
solignac-Lecomte (2001) provides a framework for trade capacity development and trade policy progress, 
as well as relating some practical experience with trade capacity development (TCD) based on TCD 
activities in African-Caribbean-Pacific countries. According to the author, policies that favour trade and 
enhance firms' participation in foreign markets are the two main requirements for a country to successfully 
integrate into the world economy - implying that donor support for TCD should be based on these two 
aims. The major contribution of the paper is that it highlights issues to look at when considering either 
strengthening policy making capacities or enhancing the competitiveness of firms. At the policy making 
level, issues to consider are analysis, formulation, negotiation and implementation. With respect to 
enhancing the competitiveness of firms, donors should consider intervention in infrastructure, standards 
and technical requirements, information, and marketing and management. The paper also emphasized 
the need for TCD programmes to be demand driven. 
Solignac-Lecomte's review of TCD activities in ACP countrieshighlights the following limitations: 
• Biased Aid arises when donorsdecide what type of assistance to render according to their interests as 
opposed to those of the recipient country. 
• Lack of donor coordination and capacity bottlenecks frequently handicap specific trade focused 
projects. 
• Absence of comprehensiveness often afflicts approaches to trade capacity issues. Of all the 
programmes reviewed JITAP was noted as an 'exception' in this respect, despite some weakness 
revealed in its mid-term review in 2000. 
• A legitimacy problem for TCD activities arises due to the fact that the link between trade development 
and poverty is still far from clear to both developing countries' policy makers and within donor 
agencies. This prompts Solignac-Lecomte to scepticism about the institutional prioritization oITCD. 
Deere (2005) examines the political dimensions of trade-related technical assistance and capacity 
building (TACB), focusing primarily on WTO-related issues,and argues that there is need for more 
demand-driven TRCB. The paper argues that to achieve fairness and predictabletrading environments 
there is a need to overhaul the way in which trade-related technical assistance and capacity building for 
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trade negotiations, regulation and policy reform is pursued (Deere, 2005:3). Deere stresses that unequal 
political and economic power relations are a defining feature of the global trading system, and argues 
thatTACB efforts should therefore focus on empowering developing countries to act independently with 
respect to domestic reforms. This would at minimum suggest the following capabilities for a country: 
(1) a team of technically competent, diplomatically-savvy negotiators in Geneva that can 
participate effectively and persuasively in ongoing negotiations and decision-making; 
(2) an equally informed back-up team in the capital able to articulate the various national 
interests, negotiating objectives and strategies, as well as a layer of expertise ex1ernal to 
government(in business, academia, research centres and NGOs) that can provide trade policy 
advice togovernment; 
(3) an effective domestic policymaking process which involves a spectrum of relevant 
government agencies and draws systematically on expertise and advice ex1ernal to the 
government; 
(4) an ability to forge, maintain and service effective coalitions with other countries on particular 
issues of negotiation; and 
(5) the capacity to use the WTO's dispute settlement process to defend and advance legal rights. 
Unfortunately these are areas that are rarely addressed by TACB. Deere further notes that review of 
recent evaluations of TACB initiatives reveals a recurring set of shortcomings, not only with the quantity 
but also with conceptualisation, quality and delivery. Commonly cited shortcomings include inadequate 
assessment and articulation of needs, donor-driven priorities, biased content, inadequate donor 
evaluation and coordination, inadequate funding, weak support for local capacity, and weak linkage to 
broader development strategies (Deere 2005:3). 
Puti (2005) sets out a comprehensive vision for a trade-related support plan for Least Developed 
Countries (LDCs). The paper based on synthesis of policy reports, discussions and sentiments within the 
international community, argues that the condition that LDCs are in today is very similar to that of Europe 
in the aftermath of the VVWII, implying that, if a similar initiative to the Marshall Plan was devised welfare 
gains would be realized. Among other strategies, the paper suggests provision of standards-related 
capacity to overcome market entry barriers and the creation of Aid for Trade fund, with seed money of $1 
billion. The paper also emphasises the importance of productive capacity, competitiveness and critical 
infrastructure. The author also raises another possible dimension ofTRCB not currently explored in the 
ongoing programmes, namely south-south cooperation, arguing that initiatives among developing 
countries complement the multilateral liberalization process. This call was based on the fact that trade 
between developing countrieshas been increasing with share of exports rising from 22 per cent in 1998 to 
more than 31 per cent in 2003 (Puti, 2005:43). While the intended purpose for the proposed 'Trade 
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Marshall Plan" is noble, absence of empirical analysis to back such propositions raises questions about 
their feasibility and anticipated impact. For instance, is $1 billion (proposed in the paper) enough to kick 
start a comprehensive TRCB programme in developing countries, given their huge capacity demands? 
In addition to reviews ofTRCB activities, there are also annual reports on TRCB activities by the donor 
community (e.g. Joint WTO/OECD report (various issues), Strategic Review of WTO, (2006)) which give 
descriptive information on types ofTRCB activities being implemented - when, where, amounts spent and 
so on. Findings in these documents fed into the discussion of the previous chapter; and as such will not 
be repeated here. The information contained in these reports/documents is interesting in its own right, 
but falls short of addressing queries about the extent to which developing countries are benefiting from 
such initiatives, what are the trade ofts of implementing one form ofTRCB at the expense of the other, 
and whether resources being maximally utilised. Such lack of critical insights means that policymakers 
interested in developing TRCBstrategies cannot really pursue evidence-based policy. However, if they 
design policy anyway, there is a big chance that it will be ineffectual. That kind of analysis is the central 
topic of my thesis, which aims to evaluate TRCB performance under different policy scenarios. 
In the crucial area of the impact ofTRCB on trade/growth in SSA, there is one econometric paper by 
Dupasquier and Osakwe (2004). They report both parametric and non-parametric correlation tests of the 
likely long-run impact of trade capacity building in SSA. The paper reviews JITAP and the Integrated 
Framework initiatives and notes that the outcomes of some TRCB projects are intangible in the short run, 
thus making it difficult to conduct impact assessment. The paper also notes that in addition to donor 
TRCB projects, other government initiatives also affect capacity development, hence making it difficult to 
determine proportions due to donor TRCB support. Absence of long series aggregate data on trade 
capacity building by country and donor is also noted. The paper therefore makes use of a cross-section 
approach for its analysis, constructing correlations of expenditure on TRCBwith key economic and social 
variables. On this basis, inferences about the likely impact ofTRCB are drawn. Their major findings are 
that there is a positive and significant correlation between expenditure on trade capacity and domestic 
regulatory quality (government effectiveness), that trade capacity building promotes exports, and that 
there is a positive correlation between trade capacity and political instability and also a positive correlation 
with HIV/AIDS prevalence. Political instability and high HIV/AIDS levels imply sustainability problems in 
the long run. Generally, the findings of the paper give mixed evidence regarding long-run sustainability 
ofTRCB in SSA. 
The authors note that SSA countries are incapacitated by lack of negotiation skills, being small in 
economic size and political power, lack of financial resources, lack of well-trained trade economists, 
limited exports and production structure diversification, and lack of the capacity to exploit trading 
opportunities due to supply constraints. The paper recommends that donors pay more attention to poor 
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educational systems. lack of access to trade information. poor infrastructure. brain drain concerns. and 
HIV/AIDS. 
12.4.2 Overviewof Related Previous Work 
Closely related to TRCB are trade facilitation issues which have recently attracted a lot of empirical 
interest. Trade facilitation issues were added to the new basket of trade issues during the Singapore 
Ministerial Meeting of the WTO in 1996 (Wilson. Mann and Otsuki. 2003). Borrowing from Woo and 
Wilson (2000). Wilsonet a/(2003:2) give a broad definition oftrade facilitation as an initiative that · ... implies 
improved efficiency. in the administration. procedures. and logistics at ports and customs.... and 
streamlined regulatory environments. deeper harmonisation of standards, and conformance to 
intemational regulations'. In earlier studies Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models were used to 
quantify the benefits of improved trade facilitation. 'In CGE models an improvement in trade facilitation 
can be modelled equivalently as a reduction in the costs of international trade or as an improvement in 
the productivity of the international transportation sector. Since this sector is already included in the CGE 
model. the effect of improved trade facilitation comes from shocking the sector by an appropriate amount' 
(Wilsonet a/2003:4-5). 
This thesis will borrow heavily from papers that have used gravity model analyses to assess the benefits 
of trade facilitation from both intemational and regional perspectives. While TRCB is a multi-dimensional 
initiative that addresses human capacity, infrastructure and institutional issues. related studies in most 
cases take a single-sector approach. This limits understanding of comparative benefits ofTRCB policy 
mixes. 
According to Limao and Venables (2001) the real cost of trade,which includes transport and other costs of 
doing business internationally. are the important determinants ofa country's ability to participate fully in 
the world economy. In their paper. the authors focus on one aspect ofTRCB (infrastructure) and highlight 
the dependence of trade costs on it. Measures for infrastructure used in the study are related to the 
quality of transport (road and rail) and communication networks. The main finding of the paper is that 
infrastructure is the main determinant of transport costs, especially for land locked countries. where it 
accounts for 60% of transport cost compared to 40% in coastal countries. The paper estimates that a 
deterioration of infrastructure from the median to the 75th percentile of destinations raises transport costs 
by 12%. Regarding the importance of transport costs in determining trade flows. the paper finds an 
elasticity of trade flow with respect to transport cost in the range of -2 to -3.5. Using an elasticity of -3 the 
paper concludes that doubling the transport costs from a median value reduces trade volumes by 45 
percent. 
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Shepherd and Wilson (2006) use the gravity model to show that improved road network quality in Europe 
and Central Asia improves interregional trade flows. The paper uses two measures of road quality which 
are weighted average of paved roads in both the exporting and importing countries and minimum percent 
of paved roads across exporting, importing and transit countries. Using simulations the authors show that 
an improved road network canproduce more trade benefit for a region than tariff reforms or improved 
customs. Inter-regional trade could increase by 50% above the baseline. The paper also shows that by 
focusing on improving road networks in countries which are important transit corridors inter-regional trade 
could be increased by 30%, raising the issue of spillovers in infrastructure projects. 
In a study ofthe impact of road network quality on intra-regional trade in Sub-Sahara Africa, Buys et al. 
(2006) arrive at conclusions similar to those ofShepherd and Wilson (2006). The paper makes use of 
spatial network analysis to map the network of roads in Sub-Saharan capitals and cities. A gravity model 
then is then employed to estimate current overland trade flows in the network between 3403 city pairs. 
The authors then simulate the impact of an improved road network to a functional quality comparable to 
current levels in The Gambia and Zimbabwe. Their simulation shows an increase in intra-regional trade 
of $250bn over 15 years due to a coordinated improvement in the road network, with total expenditure of 
approximately $35 billion for upgrading and maintenance (Buys et al. 2006:45). Even though this paper 
focuses exclusively on one component of infrastructure (quality of road network), the methodology 
employed in the analysis (in particular the simulation to estimate the impact of upgrading the road 
network) is of particular interest for the present thesis, which makes similar use of simulation. 
Nordas and Piermartini (2004) examine the role of infrastructure quality on trade performance. The 
authors use the following indicators to capture infrastructure quality: roads, airports, ports, 
telecommunications and time required for customs clearance. They argue that poor infrastructure inflicts 
costs by causing unnecessary delays, and therefore include transport time in the specification of 
infrastructure quality. They authors also maintain that uncertainty with regard to delivery time increases 
total transaction costs because 'the more uncertain is delivery, the more inventory is needed as a buffer 
stock if demand fluctuations are unrelated to fluctuations in delivery time' (Nordas and Piermartini, 2004: 
2). The paper uses a gravity model to evaluate the impact of infrastructure quality on trade in three 
sectors - automotive, textiles and clothing manufacturing. The general finding is that quality o.f 
infrastructure has a positive and Significant impact on bilateral trade flows, with port efficiencyfound to 
have the largest impact. 'Timeliness and access to telecommunication are relatively more important for 
export competitiveness in the clothing and automotive sector respectively' (Nordas and Piermartini, 2004: 
1). The major contribution of the paper is the broader definition of infrastructure to include behind-the 
border indicators that impact on international trade transaction costs, and the inclusion of resistance 
parameters related to both tariffs and remoteness. Like most papers on trade facilitation this paper looks 
at one aspect ofTRCB(infrastructure), and therefore does not go further into assessing the relative 
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importance of other factors that affect transaction costs such as institutions, which according to the model 
specification of the paper are captured through country fixed-effects. 
Jansen and Nordas (2004: 2) remind us that 'international trade involves contracts between parties 
operating in different jurisdictions, different institutional environments, and different currencies and often 
speaking different languages'. The authors note that these differences result in uncertainties regarding 
quality and quantity of goods shipped and received, and cause high transactional costs associated with 
contract negotiations, enforcement and information and financial flows. They therefore analyse the effect 
of domestic institutions on total volume of trade and direction of trade, controlling for domestic 
infrastructure. They conclude that a country's level of openness and bilateral trade flows are positively and 
significantly influenced by quality of institutions. Using data from Kaufmann et ai, the paper identifies 
three indicators to measure the quality of institutions: government effectiveness, rule of lawand, control of 
corruption. The study finds that institutional variables have a significant and positive impact on trade 
flows. It also finds that tariffs have a significant impact on trade flows only if interacted with institutions, 
rmplying that the impact of tariff reduction on trade is significant only if institutions are good. The authors 
also include quality of infrastructure, and find the relation between domestic institutions and bilateral trade 
to be less robust. On bilateral trade analysis the study finds that 'relative bilateral tariffs are strongly and 
negatively related to bilateral trade flows' (Jansen and Nordas, 2004: 21). While these authors address 
some of issues of interest to this thesis, they do not develop the argument further to assess the benefits 
on trade flows as a result ofimprovements in the quality ofinstitutions and infrastructure. 
Anderson and Marcoullier (2000) also examine this issue ofinstitutions and trade flows and conclude that 
trade expands when supported by strong institutions21 . The authors note that ignoring issues of contract 
enforcement and security of exchanges will result in estimates with omitted variables bias. They consider 
two types of insecurity, pertaining to predation and to imperfect enforcement of contract, and show that 
that both translate into price mark-ups. 
Wilson, Mann and Otsuki (2003) explore the relationship between trade facilitation, trade flows and GDP 
per capita based on trade among members ofthe Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) trade area. 
They use four broad indicators (port efficiency, customs environment, regulatory and electronic-business 
usage) to define trade facilitation, and estimate their relationship with trade flows using an augmented 
gravity model. Their findings indicate that port efficiency improvement has a large and positive effect on 
trade. Through a simulation exercise which tests differential improvements in these four areas, the 
authors estimate benefits of specific trade facilitation efforts. They find that intra-APEC trade would 
21 " .. spectfically, by a legal system capable of enforcing commercial contracts and transparent and impartial fonnulation and 
implementation of government economic policy" (Anderson and MarcouUier, 2000: 2). 
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increase by $254 billion if those countries that are below the average improve their capacity to the sample 
average. 
Piazza and Sdralevich (2004) provide evidence on the role of trade capacity in the diversification or 
product differentiation process of SSA countries. The paper describes trade capacity as the 'availability 
of trade-oriented infrastructure, institutions, know-how, necessary to export competitively on foreign 
markets, and the ability to gain access to those markets through bilateral and multilateral negotiations and 
participation in multilateral trade organizations' (2004: 2). Given this definition of trade capacity the paper 
then uses the notion of revealed trade capacity as measured by the OECD's share in each SSA country's 
total trade. The authors argue that the more differentiated the goods the more difficult it is for SSA 
countries to export them to more developed markets. This hypothesis is tested using a standard bilateral 
trade gravity equation augmented with a term representing the interaction between development and 
product differentiation, and tariffs data with an industry breakdown. The authors use a gravity model with 
standard variables of borders, distance, colonial ties (colony), common language, Gross Domestic 
Product (GOP), landlocked, tarrifs for both the exporting and importing country. The model is then 
augmented by an interaction term that combines the SSA exporters' trade capacity with the level of 
development of the target market and Rauch index that measures of sectoral differentiation. The 
following model specification is estimated 
Equation 1: 
In(exPijm) = a + flborderslj + yin (dis tan celj ) + A In(gdp,) + pln(gdPJ) + D(colonoYij) 
+ !/J(commonlagwgelj) + ,(landlocked,) + OJ{landlocke~) + B(avgtarifum) + 7r(rauchindex".) 
+ p(int eractionl mJ ) + Ei 
Where i and j stand respectively for the exporting and the importing country. 
The preliminary results of the study support the idea that SSA countries may need trade capacity building 
focused on helping them understand developed countries' markets for manufactured products. 
Wilson, Mann and Otsuki (2005) develop a gravity equation to assess the benefits of trade facilitation 
from a global perspective. They distinguish four categories of trade facilitation which are port 
infrastructure, customs environment, regulation and e-business infrastructure, and include them in a 
gravity model. The paper adopts a trade facilitation definition that incorporates both at-border and inside-
border elements, thus covering issues such as port efficiency, customs administration, domestic 
regulatory environment, and services infrastructure. The following is the gravity model specification used 
in the paper: 
Equation 2 
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InV: = a o + bl In(IOO + TARIFF,;) + b, InPE j + b,InREj + b.lnSlj + b,lnPE[ + b6lnRE[ 
+ b, In inS![ + b,CE[ + b. In GNP/ + blO In(GNP;) + bl! In(GNPPC;) + bl2 In(GNPPC~) 
+bl3 ln(DISTj[)+b l.DADJ +bI5DASEAN +bI6DNAFTA +b17 DLAlA +b18 DAUNZ +bI9DMERCOSUR +b,oDEU 
wherei and j stand for importer and exporter respectively; PE, RE, 51 are indicators for port efficiency, 
regulatory environment and service sector infrastructure; Vij is the value of exports from j to i; 
TARIFF'j; is the specific applied tariff rate between j and i in year t; CE; is the customs environment 
variable for the importer; GNP is the Gross National Product; GNPPC is per capita GNP; DI5Tu denotes 
geographical distance between capital cities oli and j; DNAFTA, DASEAN, DLAIA, DAUNZ, DMERCOUSUR, DEU are 
trade agreement dummies; DENG, DFRC, DsPN, DARB, DCHN, DGMN, DpoR, DRUS are language dummies; and 
DADJ is the adjacency dummy which takes a value of one if i is adjacent to j and zero otherwise. 
While the paper concludes that improvement in all three forms of trade facilitation yields an increase in 
global trade, 'results also show that each trade facilitation variable has a different estimated relationship 
to trade flows, implying that improvement in one category of trade facilitation will yield a different effect on 
trade than improvement in another category of trade facilitation' (WMO 205:851). 
Helble, Mann and Wilson (2009) study brings together literature on the relationship between trade 
facilitation and trade flows, and aid flows and trade flows with the aim of investigating the effectiveness of 
foreign aid towards trade facilitation in increasing trade of developing countries. In their analysis the 
authors make use of disaggregated data on aid flows which allows them to examine the relationship 
between trade and different types of aid extended and received. The paper classified trade facilitation 
into four categories namely narrow, broad, hard and soft trade facilitation22. Using data covering 16 years 
from 1990 to 2005, the study employs a gravity model to analyses the effectiveness of trade aid on trade 
flows. The findings show evidence that aid for trade facilitation is positively related to both exports and 
imports of the recipients. According to the study, targeted aid for trade agenda associated with trade 
policy and regulations will yield the highest returns for exporters. 
Gamberoni and Newfarmer (2009) analyseboth supply of and demand for aid for trade. They argue that 
under-performance in export markets by many developing countries resultsfrom trade-related capacity 
constraints, which include weak infrastructure (transport, ports, telecommunications and information 
22 Narrow trade facilitation focused on both border and behind the border reforms; Broad - includes border (ports, roads) and 
services (telecoms, finace); hard - investment into infrastructure projects (board aid) and soft trade facilitation includes -
institutional capacity related to trade. 
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technology), under-developed trade-related institutions (customs and port management) and insufficient 
incentives to export (Gamberoni and Newfarmer, 2009: 11). Their paper makes use of a gravity model 
and cross-sectional data for 2006 to explore capacity indicators that predict trade levels. In their model, if 
quality of infrastructure increases by 1 percent trade increases by 4 percent.For institutions,they find that 
if the time it takes to convey and process exports through customs is reduced by one day, this leads to a 
3.5 percent increase in exports. Where trade-related incentives are concerned,the paper finds that 
reducing the exporter share of tariff lines subject to tariff peaks by 10 percent raises exports by roughly 2 
percent. 
Gamberoni and Newfarmer argue that if indicators of infrastructure, institutions and trade policy related 
incentives have such strong influence on trade flows, then countries with poor quality on these indicators 
should benefit from aid for trade. The paper further explores how donors can gauge potential 
demand/users for trade-related assistance by focusing on those countries that have intemal capacity 
limitations as shown by poor infrastructure, inefficient customs facilities,weak trade-related institutions, and 
disincentives to export because of high tariff peaks and ill-designed trade policy. A country is taken to be 
in need of aid for trade it falls intothe bottom rankings in all of these areas. Using a scale ranging 
between 1 and 5 (best capacity to worst), the authors approximate potential demand for aid for trade by 
simply adding up a country's total score. If a country is in the bottom quintile (a score of 5) in all the areas 
it receivesthe highest possible score. The finding of the paper is that most LDCs and other low-income 
countries show strongest potential demand for aid for trade. However, bilaterally supplied aid for trade 
(Iincludingaid from Japan, the US and the EU)shows a greater share (52 %) going to middle income 
countries. Most multilateral aid for trade goes, more appropriately, to low income countries. The authors 
conclude that some countries receive far less aid for trade than their potential demand indicates. In 
addition, they argue that several countries have not fully harnessed the global economy to best serve 
their development goals, and theythus identifyurgent need to draw governments' attention to 
competitiveness strategies and mobilisation of aid for trade resources (Gamberoni and Newfarmer, 
2009:11 ). 
Portugal-Perez, Alberto and Wilson (2010) estimate the impact of aggregate indicators of "soft" and "hard" 
infrastructure on the export performance of developing countries. They looked at 101 countries over the 
period 2004-2007. They make an important contribution by constructing four new aggregate indicators 
related to trade facilitation from a wide range of primary indicators, (collected mainly from the WEF's 
Global Competitiveness Report, Doing Business, the World Development Indicators,a and Transparency 
Intemational), using factor analysis. The authors identify four indicators, two of them more related to hard 
infrastructure as i) physical infrastructure and ii) information and communications technology (ICT). The 
other two indicators are more closely linked to the "soft" dimension: iii) border and transportefficiency and 
iv) the business and regulatory environment. The impact of these trade facilitation indicators on trade 
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performance is assessed using a gravity model, with a two-step selection model to deal with sample 
selection bias. The authors also take note of a potential reverse causality problem(endogeneity) and 
address it in three ways. Firstly they employ an approach adopted by Francois and Manchini (2007)and 
regress trade facilitation on income per capita and population, using the unexplained residuals to proxy 
for the trade facilitation indicators.Secondly,trade facilitation indicators are instrumented by their 3-year 
lagged value. Finally, they examine effects oftrade facilitation indicators on new products. The analysis 
shows that improvement in infrastructure quality would bring the greatest benefits in terms of export 
growth, and that among the four indicators, physical infrastructure has the greatest impact on exports in 
almost all specifications and samples used. Using gravity estimates the authors show that improvements 
in infrastructure and border and transport efficiency halfway to the level of the regional top performer 
show promising results. For example they estimate that if quality of physical infrastructure in Egypt were 
to increasehalf-way to the level of Tunisia, this would increase Egyptian exports by 10.8 percent. 
However, the authors find that when the endogeneity problem is controlled for the effect of physical 
infrastructure is smaller than the baseline estimates. 
Iwanow and Kirkpatrick (2008) construct aggregated indicators of trade facilitation (in the on-the-border 
sense), and infrastructure for 2003 and 2004, using simple averagesof primary indicators mainly collected 
from Doing Business and the World Development Indicators. They estimate a standard gravity model 
augmented with these indicators and find a positive impact of the three indicators on exports. To focus 
theiranalysis more specificallyon Africa, the authors interact their indicators with an African dummy, and 
find that policies that improve their indicators yield a higher effect in African countries compared with the 
rest of the world. 
Njinkeu, Wilson and Powo Fosso (2008) assess the trade facilitation agenda for Africausing a gravity 
model of bilateral trade in the African countries and the Rest of the world. They follOW the approach of 
Wilson et al. (2003a, 2003b, 2004) by including a set of trade facilitation indicators (port efficiency, 
customs and regulatory environment, and services infrastructure) as well as tariffs and dummies for 
regional trade agreements to see which of these factors might have a greater effect on intra-African trade 
flows. To account for zero or missing bilateral observation the authors make use of Tobit model in their 
estimation of an augmented gravity model which includes the following variables: value of manufactured 
exports from country j to i; the applied tariff rate in the percent ad valorem term that is specific to trading 
partners i and j; national indicators of port efficiency, customs environment, regulatory environment, and 
service infrastructures; gross national incomes and per capita GNI coefficients; and dummy variables to 
capture the effect of preferential trade agreements, language similarity and adjacency. They find that port 
efficiency and services infrastructure are the factors that have the largest positive effect on African trade, 
with customs and regulatory environments being the main obstacles to intra-African flows. In conclusion, 




they call for further research that focuses on factors that may explain why trade does not occur at all 
among some pairs of countries. 
In adifferent but related strand of literature, Grainger (2007:12) provides a review of trade facilitation that 
classifies it according to four principles: Simplification, standardization, harmonization and modernization 
of international trade procedures. The main focus is on day-to-day operational issues of moving goods 
across national borders, with the aim of identifying potential improvements to interfaces between 
businesses and governments. The authors note that, despite the prominence of trade facilitation in 
recent years, literature that employs rigorous research methods remains meager (Grainger 2007:4). 
Additionally, substantiated research that looks at quantifying trade transactional costs is also rare, making 
it difficult to quantify benefits. Grainger argues that to understand the context of trade facilitation one has 
to take note of the increasing internationalization of production structure and business supply chains. 
Therefore, in the international environment in which production take place, simplification of procedures 
and ensuring smooth interfaces between businesses and governments become major challenges for 
trade facilitation. As tariff rates have fallen, trade negotiators have focused increasingly on non-tariff 
areas. Therefore, to facilitate trade a number of international, regional and national governments have 
promoted best practices, improved business-government cooperation, the adoption of technical standards 
and harmonized trade and customs procedures (Grainger 2007:12). 
Suwa-Eisennman and Verdier (2007) survey the recent theoretical and empirical literature that explores 
the relations between aid and trade, and highlight some recurring issues. They question whether aid 
policies tend to act as complements or substitutes of trade policies. The expectation, they suggest, 
should be that trade policy influences trade flows, either because of economic conditions created by 
trade-related assistance, or because aid is tied to trade and reinforcesbilateral economic and political 
links between giving and receiving countries. However, the literature reviewindicates that there can be 
reserve causality between aid and trade. Thus the literature taken as a whole fails to provide 
straightforward and robust results regarding complementarity between aid and trade flows. The paper 
discuses literature that looks at income transfers and how they affect welfare of both donor and recipient 
countries. The authors note that existence of trade barriers can result in recipient countries losing from 
aid transfer. The issue of tied aid and how it affects the impact of aid transfer is another issue of 
particular interest. The review highlights a finding by Wargner (2003), who shows that increaSing aid to a 
country by 10% increases the donor country's exports to the recipient by 1.63%. What generally emerges 
from Suwa-Eisennman and Verdier (2007),s review is that there is a myriad of possibilities that can arise 
from Aid and Trade analysis; the relationship is not direct, measures are not standard, and there are no 
straightforward robust results in the literature. 
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The literature review here shows that empirical research assessing the impact of trade-related capacity 
building and trade facilitation is very recent and addresses three main issues: definition and measurement 
of indicators (with some literature focusing on a narrower definition while others look at the broader 
aspects of TRCS); choosing an econometric methodology to estimate the impact of trade-related capacity 
building and trade facilitation on trade flows; and designing a scenario to estimate the effect of improved 
trade-related capacity building and trade facilitation on trade flows. Many of the studies are produced 
exclusively by policy-makers, and contain tools, recommendations, reports, position papers, and 
commentaries. In sum it is voluminous. There remain, however, significant gaps in the academic literature 
on traded-related capacity building. 
This thesis aims at capturing a broader question than the one reviewed by most literature.ln particular, it 
aims at investigating the opportunity costs of different TRCS policy mixes in SSA. Thus the choice of 
literature for inclusion in the foregoing review was guided by methodological considerations. Mann, and 
Otsuki (2003) were the first authors to measure the impact of trade facilitation on trade performance using 
a gravity model.They also introduced the simulation methodology to estimate impact of different policy 
scenarios. The present study borrows heavily from their approach, and narrows its literature review mainly 
to work that is straightforwardly comparable with them. Therefore, the discussion of literature in this review 
has been selective rather than exhaustive, focusing on results upon which subsequent analysis builds. 
Many researchers have grounded their studies more explicitly on either trade facilitation issues or sub-
elements ofTRCS, in particular infrastructure and institution issues. The former, which is a narrower 
focus than TRCS, investigates the impact of border issues on bilateral trade flows. While I do not deny 
the potential relevance of this work, in the current environment of reduced development aid, the need to 
prioritise budgets becomes more pressing. This justifies my departing from most previous researchers in 
focusing on opportunity costs. To rectify the paucity of theory pertaining to this, I make use of policy 
simulations and estimate benefits of different TRCS policy initiatives. The key precursor papers which are 
available to be built upon are Shepherd and Wilson (2006), who applied leading elements of the methods 
on which I will rely to trade facilitation issues in Europe and Central Asia and Wilson, Mann and Otsuki 
(2003) who treat the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) trade area with these same methods. 
Policy simulation methodology has the advantage that one may adopt different TRCSpolicy mixes to test 
responses of trade flows. A number of different policy simulations are presented in the thesis. Such 
focus on opportunity costs may benefit policy practitioners because it may provide new insights on how to 
manage TRCS initiatives for higher benefits. 
2.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
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In this chapter, based on interview work and desk study, we have interrogated the design, coherence and 
implementation ofTRCB activities by bilateral and multilateral donors. Several issues have emerged from 
this analysis: 
First, there is a wide range of specific TRCB products on offer in developing countries, which are either 
earmarked towards human capital, institutional or infrastructural development23 . Providers ofTRCBdo not 
focus their efforts exclusivelyon one kind ofTRCB initiative but in every case offer initiatives in at least two 
of these areas. More specifically, all agencies are inVOlved in human capacity development although the 
focus is different from one to another. (For example, the wro emphasizes training of government 
officials, while the ITC emphasizes training of small to medium size business entrepreneurs). However, 
the donor community seems to have recognized that they cannot do all things; hence coordination and 
synergies are being emphasized (e.g. in the case of JITAP and IF), and calls are emerging to leverage 
available funds so as to get the most out of the resources. 
Second, while activities being implemented by both bilateral and multilateral donors are clearly articulated 
in programme documents and also by trade officials in interviews, what do not emerge from these 
documents are exact theoretical or empirical rationales forvarying emphasis placed on different initiatives. 
How decisions are made is not clear from programme document - in particular, the reasons as to why 
different activities get precedence over others from different donors. are not clearly specified. For 
instance, why is it that Africa gets more assistance for trade policy and regulations related activities as 
opposed to trade and development or infrastructure development? Likewise, why has Asia been getting 
very large amounts ofTRCB funds for infrastructure over the years? Africa's level of infrastructure 
development is much lower than that of other developing regions. Could it be that infrastructure 
investment in Asia is more welfare-enhancing on the margin than in Africa? Or could it be that 
infrastructure investments in Asia have greater impact because its institutions are better than Africa's? 
This possibility highlights the possible importance of complementarities in trade capacity building. 
Third, from interviews and discussions with trade officials in Geneva there emerges the view that TRCB 
initiatives were undertaken as a means to bring developing countries on board to allow the launch ofthe 
Doha Round following the collapse of the Seattle wro Ministerial Meeting. In the absence of explicit 
policy evaluation adequately addressing questions raised in this chapter, among others, it seems unlikely 
that TRCB initiatives have been closely informed by rigorous economics of trade and development and 
empirical research. This raises an issue which warrantsin depth analysis: the political economy of trade-
related capacity building. It could be that because TRCB/trade facilitation came under the wro umbrella 
through contestation around the so-called 'Singapore Issues" dividing developing and poor from 
developed countries, only secondarily economic political considerations may have dominatedgenuine 
23 Wnh the 2006 Joint WTOIOECD report outlining 24000 TRCS activities. 
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economic rationales and drivers. As noted above, Gamberoni and Newfarmer (2009), in their study of 
supply of and demand for aid for trade conclude that some countries receive far less aid for trade than 
their potential demandindicateds. According to the authors, this could be due to excessive corruption, 
political instability or poor investment climates, which affect aid effectiveness and hence the elegibility of 
countries for aid. Therefore, once TRCB become associated with trade negotiations, trade bindings and 
other performance criteria; it could be TRCB becomes strongly informed by other conSiderations. Deere 
(2005) recognises the importance of considering the political dimensions of trade-related technical 
assistance and capacity building, and notes that outcomes of trade negotiations are often asymmetr'lc, 
placing onerous burdens on developing countries. Furthermore, Deere (2005:7) notes the imbalance in 
negotiating power (both in terms of basic representation, and size and skills of negotiating teams) 
between developed and developing countries. Not only are developing countries not adequately 
represented in Geneva but they also have limited access to back up expertise in their capitals (Deere, 
2005:12). According to Deere, the Quad group of countries (Japan, EU, Canada and the USA) with a 
combined population of about 900 million, have twice as many professional staff permanently based in 
Geneva as all developing countries with an aggregate population of about 4.1 billion. 
Fourthly, no systematic implementation strategy or identification criteria seem to be in place to guide 
donors globally. For instance, TRCB activities implemented by bilateral donors seem to be dictated by 
their respective development agendas which are normally outlined in national policy papers. For 
instance, Denmark's TRTNCB strategy is outlined in Trade and Development: Tackling Poverty (2003), 
and that of the EU as a whole in Trade and Development: Assisting Developing Countries to Benefit from 
Trade (2002). Japan's TRTNCB activities are guided by Action Plan for Implementing the Paris 
Declaration (2005). The US follows the goals laid out inUSAID strategy paper, Building Trade Capacity in 
the Developing World (2003).Such a scenario, in which programmes are informed by different policy 
strategies with different objectives and priorities, raises more questions than answers regarding issues of 
coherence, coordination and synergies among implementing agencies. In addition, if specific TRCB 
activities are guided by donors' policies, how relevant or appropriate are they likely to be to recipient 
nations' development needs? 
It is against this background of both increased demand for and supply ofTRCB assistance, in theabsence 
of explicit policy evaluation, that I consider its potential value and opportunity coststo warrant in-depth 
analysis. Given that resources are limited, there is need to evaluate the impact of trade-related technical 
assistance offered by different agencies.Rodrik (2001) raises concern regarding policies that explicitly 
promote international integration, alleging that this diverts resources from some other urgent development 
needs of poor nations. The present thesis makes a contribution to the TRCB policy debate by providing 
research and analYSis that interrogates in detail the following three important questions: 
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• Are the weights assigned to different components of trade-related capacity building activities in 
existing TRCB programmes justified? 
• To what extent will participation in the MTS be enhanced by trade-related capacity building 
(TRCB)? 
• Given the fact that more resources on TRCB imply fewer for other development priorities, what is 
the opportunity cost of investing resources in one particular TRCB approach as opposed to 
another? 
To find answers to these questions, the following chapter focuses on empirically asseSSing the effect 
ofTRCB through estimation of a standard gravity model augmented by TRCB proxies. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE IMPACT OFTRADE-RELATED CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT ON SUB-SAHARAN AFRICAN 
TRADE 
3.0 INTRODUCTION 
The main focus of this chapter is the empirical evaluation ofTRCB policies, using a gravity model. The 
chapter discussesin detail the data used in this thesis in terms of its sources, definitions, and proxies 
used in the construction ofTRCB indicators. In the same chapter the theoretical foundation ofthe gravity 
model, which is later used in the empirical section, is also discussed. Special attention is given to 
specification and sample selection bias issues, and to how these issues have been addressed in recent 
empirical literature and in this thesis. 
Using the Heckman two-step selection approach, this chapter focuses on the estimation of the gravity 
equation to determine the relative impactsof institutions, infrastructure and human capital on bilateral 
trade flows. To adequately investigate these relative impacts ofTRCB the empirical analysis will be 
organized around the following four main themes: 
.. Whetherand to what extent TRCB matters in determining trade flows; 
.. Whether interactionsofTRCB policy mixes (policy complementarities) make a difference; 
.. Whether and to what extent Africadiffers from the rest of the world in response of trade to TRCB, and 
.. Whether the results are robust to changes in estimation methodology or to the change in the 
constructions ofTRCB-related composite indicesof variables. 
There has been a surge of empirical literature which has looked at these issues in the context of trade 
costs, which have been identified as an important determinant of a country's ability to participate fully in 
the world economy (limao and Venables, 2001). The model is estimated using trade patterns in 2005 for 
a set of 117 world countries of which 24 are in sub-Sahara Africa2 .. This dataset gives 13572 possible 
bilateral export relationships and approximately 15% of these export flows are zeros. In recent 
contributions to the theoretical literature on the gravity model the issue of zero bilateral trade flows has 
received attention. It has been noted that disregarding these zero flows may bias estimates if their 
occurrence is not random. To avoid such bias a sample selection model based on the methodology of 
Heckman (1979) is adopted in our estimation. The gravity equation is also estimated using other 
approaches that have been suggested to deal with zero trade values in order to assess the sensitivity of 
24 List of all the countries in the sample is given in Appendix 3, with SSA countries highlighted in bold letters. 
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the results to use of different methods. A comparative evaluation of policies aimed at increasing human 
capital, infrastructure and institutional capacities, is also undertaken. This simulation exercise will be the 
basis for measuring the opportunity costs of the TRCB policy options. 
3.1 DESCRIPTION OF THE TRCB VARIABLES 
Trade-related capacity building goes beyond trade facilitation (which has dominated empirical literature in 
recent years) which focuses on mere movement of goods across borders. Considering supply-side 
capacity is in the spirit of the Hong Kong Declaration, which recognized the need for countries to address 
such capacity to realizing benefits from mo agreements. As mentioned above, three distinct areas for 
trade-related capacity building are identified as institutions, infrastructure and human capital. In addition 
to a number of articles in the agreements reached at the conclusion of the Uruguay Round and General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GA TI) making provision for these areas; our overview of on-going 
TRCB activities also points towards concentration of investment in these domains. Hencethis thesis takes 
into account those factors that limit economies' capacities to produce tradable goods. This however; 
raises challenges with regard to measurement and methodological issues, further compounded by lack of 
data on a number of indicators that could be used to capture trade capacity building initiatives, especially 
in Africa. We therefore identify proxies for TRCB initiatives. Informed by both theoretical, empirical 
literature and my interview work in Geneva, we use a number of variables to come up with composite 
indices for trade-related institutions, infrastructure and human capital. These indices are generated using 
survey information from the World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Report (GCR), and the 
World Bank's Doing Business Report. We rely on survey information because of the limited availability of 
relevant trade capacity building indicators. Data on trade, tariff and GDP came from the UN's 
COMTRADE database, TRAINS; and World Development Indicators (WDI) respectively. Appendix5 
gives a full description and the data sources of all variables used in this thesis. 
A central feature in our analysis of opportunity costs ofTRCB initiatives is the classification ofTRCB 
activities into human capital, institutions or infrastructure. The following sub-sections give a full 
description ofthe TRCB categories and indicators used in their construction. 
13.1.1 Institutions 
This category captures the quality of the social infrastructure (institutions) of the economy. There has 
been an increase in interest in the role of institutions for the functioning of markets. This resurgence of 
interest might be due to a general consensus that 'well-developed institutions are likely to decrease the 
transaction costs for market participants and thus increase the efficiency of markets' (Jansen and Nordas 
2004:9). From the literature review, there emerges an observation that inefficient institutions raise the 
price of traded goods, due to the insecurities surrounding doing business in the intemational market 
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(Jansen and Nordas 2004). Taking into account findings of the body of work on the role of institutions 
and also on the focus of the current TRCB initiatives, this thesis defines and measures quality of 
institutions using a composite index constructed from selected sub-indicators, all drawn from the World 
Economic Forum (WEF) Executive Opinion Survey and the World Bank's Doing Business Report. Most 
of the responses in the WEF survey were ranked on a scale of 1 to 7, with the lower figure corresponding 
to poor performance while rising numbers are desirable. Table 4below defines all the variables used in 
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13,1.2 Infrastructure 
The importance of infrastructure in economic development has well been established in the empirical 
literature, which has shown that quality of infrastructure directly and indirectly affects trade cost as well as 
the productivity of factors of production (Agenor 2006, Bogetic and Fedderke2005, Wilson et. al 2005, 
Jansen and Nordas 2004, Nordas and Piermartini 2004, Limao and Venables 2001 )25 Also, in the policy 
debate, adequate supply of infrastructure services has been noted as an important factor in economic 
development (Calderon and Serven 2008). Hence, inclusion of infrastructure in this study has its basis in 
the theoretical and empirical literature for both growth and international trade. In addition investment 
climate surveys conducted in Africa have also shown that poor infrastructure in African economies has 
severely hampered investment (OECD/NEPAD 2005). In this thesis, therefore, infrastructure indicators 
are designed to measure the extent to which an economy has the necessary physical infrastructure 
required to produce goods for export as well as to move goods (exports and imports) across borders. 
Empirical literature shows that, geographical disadvantages such as being landlocked and remote from 
global markets, increase transport costs and greatly reduce both intra and inter regional trade (Limao and 
Venables 2001). In coming up with a composite infrastructure index, I take note of the difficulty of 
isolating trade-related infrastructure promotion from infrastructure development more generally; hence I 
followed the approach adopted by the joint OECDIWTO database in regarding all infrastructure aid as 
trade related. I depart from the other literature that has looked at infrastructure and trade by including 
other proxies for infrastructure (in particular, 'Extent of marketing', 'Quality of competition in the ISP 
sector', and 'Extent of business use of the Internet') beyond the general indicators (port, telephone/fax 
lines, railroad, air transport and electricity supply). This was motivated by my findings in policy document 
reviews of on-going TRCB activities. Table 5 below shows and defines (according to the data source) the 
sub-indicators aggregated to come up with a quality of infrastructure composite index. The last column of 
the table gives reference to other empirical literature that has used the same indicators and finds them 
significant in explaining trade flows. 
25 These papers are instances of recent empirical work that investigates the relationship between trade costs and quality of 
infrastructure; hence they serve to shed light on proxies used in measuring quality of infrastructure. 
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13.1.3 Human Capacity 
According to Bergheim (2005: 1) 'human capital is the sum of the abilities and knowledge of individuals. It 
measures the quality of labour supply and can be accumulated through education, further education and 
experience. Education is an investment in human capital, while learning is the process of acquiring 
knowledge or skills through study, experience or teaching'. Bergheimalso argues that education as a 
factor in development should not be identified with formal education alone, as much human capital 
enhancement is generated by continuous updating and replacement of depreciated knowledge with new 
knowledge through on-the-job training, seminars, etc. 
Similar sentiments are expressed by the World Economic Forum's Global Competitiveness Report (2005: 
23) which notes that 'the quality and quantity of higher education provided within an economy are critical 
for competitiveness, for preparing quality staff for more complex roles in areas, such as production, 
marketing, management, and R&D. In addition to formal education, on-the-job training has become an 
increasingly important method of upgrading an economy's human resources'. 
OECD/NEPAD (2005:11) argues that the level of human capital is very lo,w in Sub-Saharan countries. As 
a result human capital development is one of the major challenges confronting the region. Lack of it 
hinders the region's ability to increase productivity and compete in the global economy. Leontief (1947),s 
analysis of US trade patterns highlighted how efficiency of workers influence trade patterns. It is 
therefore unsurprising that the overview of on-going trade-related technical assistance shows that human 
capacity issues have been given considerable attention in particular by the WTO and to some extent lTC, 
which trains business entrepreneurs. Therefore, the human capital indicator developed in this paper is 
designed to capture what TRCB is doing for human resources development.Given the current political 
economy of world trade, whereby trade negotiationsplay an important role in determining international 
trade policy, and ultimately the intergration of developing countries into the multilateral trading system, it 
is not surprising that level and quality of human capacityplays a crucial role in trade. (See background 
and introduction discussion in Chapter 1). The ability of trade negotiators to negotiate good trade deals 
and to acquire information by networking with other knowledgeable parties should increase with improved 
human capital. Furthermore, there are other factors needed to improve trade such as harnessing new 
technology in production, information and technology, and marketing;to identify just two that require 
Skilled manpower. It is in this context that the sub-indicators chosen for human capital mostly reflect 
higher education skills required for complex task management associated with trade promotion. The 
construction of an index to measure human capital is based on the following sub-indicators which are 
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available, 7 " new issues are continuously being added to the negotiation table. It is 
available from unsurplislng therefore, that donors have been involved in supporting trade 
world-class local centres and UniverSity departments that offer training in trade-related issues 
_____ ~ institutions)' J 
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3.2 MEASUREMENT OFTRCB 
To construct the TRCB indices, this study closely follows the approaches of Wilson, Mann and Otsuki 
(2003) and Nordas and Piermartini (2004), Each TRCB indicator is measured by a composite index 
constructed from variables as indicated above. As noted in the preceding section the data on different 
indicators chosen for TReB are captured using different units of measurement. Some are general 
numbers ranging from zero to many hundreds (e.g. tertiary enrolment, number of administrative 
procedures required to start a business, number of documents required to export/import, just to name a 
few) while some are ranks ranging between 1 and 7. Therefore, for modelling purposes the sub-
indicators have been put onto a common scale through the steps described below. 
Step 1: Normalising the data 
As discussed above, TReB targets are categorised either under Infrastructure (F), Institutions (I), or 
Human Capital (H). These categories are identified using the sub-indicatorvariables (x,) listed and 
explained above. The first step isto make the raw data comparable. The raw data are converted in such 
a way that they are all consistent with respect to the sign of their expected influence on trade. Variables 
that are captured as actual values where a low figure is desirable (e.g. number of administrative 
procedures required to start a business, number of documents required to export I import, etc.) are 
converted by taking an inverse of all numbers which then converts the series such that increasing 
numbers are desirable. For all other TReB sub-indicators. that are measured as indices and actual 
values in which rising numbers are expected to boost trade,(e.g., tertiary enrolment rates), these are 
normalised using the sample average of all the countries in the survey, to come up with a sub-index (Xin). 




Step 2: Composite TRCe indicator 
After normalising all the sub-indicatorvariables, the composite indicator X/m where k = F, I, or H for each 
TReB indicator in country (n), is calculated as a simple average of the normalised sub-indices. 
57 
) 1 D~5Cf.11f'1IVL 5T" liS IIGAL ANAL I'SI50F THE OAT A 
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capacity gap between SSA and noo-SSA countries recent empr-ical literature :hat has looked at trade 
effects ofTRCB has not taken human capital into "",COlint (Wil50n et al 2003 Janser and Nora~s2004) 
Aga,n. giver the fact that the bulk ofTRCB acti"tlcs are ch3nnelicd tow~rds human (ap~city de.elopment 
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Where; M;jk is the value of the flow of good or factor k from country (region) i to country (region) j; Y; 
and Yj are income in country i and j respectfully, N; and Nj are populations in country i and j; D;j is the 
distance between countries (regions) i and j and Uu is a log normally distributed error term with E(U;jk) = 
O. 
Recent developments in trade theory have provided theoretical foundations for the gravity model. 
According to Baldwin and Taglioni (2006), Anderson (1979) was the first to specify clear micro 
foundations for the gravity equation. 'The cornerstone of Anderson's theory, however, rested on an 
assumption that was viewed as ad hoc at the time, namely that each nation produces a unique good that 
is only imperfectly substitutable with other nations' goods (Baldwin and Taglioni 2006:1). This theory was 
seriously undermined by criticism in the 1970s and 1980s and other explanations were brought forward. 
Feenstra (2004) uses a monopolistic competition model to explain the theoretical framework of the gravity 
model. Under the monopolistic model each country exports varieties of differentiated products to the 
other. i, j = 1.. .. , C is the number of countries linked by common trade rules and preferences. K=1, N is 
the variety of products available, with each variety counting as a distinct product. Anderson and Van 
Wincoop (2003a) modify Anderson's (1979) equations, but make use of properties of a full expenditure 
system and apply it to cross-sectional data. The authors maintain a hypothesis of identical homothetic 
preferences across regions and assume complete specialization by each country and zero tariff and 
transport costs. Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) follow and ex1end the theory of Anderson and Van Wincoop 
(2003),as outlined below, to accommodate panel data. 
The Expenditure System 
Assuming a single country exporter from country i to country j, the authors denote the expenditure 
share identity as follows: 
Equation 4 
where Xy the quantity of bilateral exports of a single variety is from country i to country j, Plj is the price 
of the good ins'de the importing country, measured in terms of a numeraire, and. therefore Pljxlj is the 
value of trade flow also measured as a numeraire. Ej is the destination nation's expenditure (again 
measured in terms of the numeraire) on goods that compete with imports, i.e. tradable goods (Baldwin 
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and Taglioni, 2006: 3). s .. denotes the fraction of expenditure by country j on its importsof the product 
IJ 
produced in country i. 
Assuming that expenditure shares depend on relative prices, and adopting a constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) demand function, Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) construct the expenditure on the 
imported good as follows: 
Equation 5 
p 
where ; is real price of P'J ,~ is the importing country j's ideal CES price index assuming that all 
) 
goods are traded, R is the total number of countries from which country j buys (including itself), a is 
the elasticity of substitution among all varieties,and n k is the number of varieties exported from nation 
k . If equation (8) and (9) are combined we get an import expenditure equation, represented as follows: 
Equation 6 
The landed price in the importing country j can be linked to the production costs in the exporting country 
i (Pi)' the bilateral mark-up (tJ ), and the bilateral trade costs (r" ), and is expressed as follows: 
Pij = tJP, r'J ' assuming f.i = 1 (monopolistic or perfect competition conditions). 
In line with much of gravity literature, we will model bilateral trade costs as a function of all possible aids 
and impediments to bilateral trade. Accordingly, TiJ includes 'natural' barriers (bilateral distance, 
adjacency, land border, etc.), various measures of man-made trade costs (free trade agreements, etc.), 
and cultural barriers (differences in language, religion, etc.) (Baldwin & Taglioni 2006:6). It is within this 
framework that institutions, infrastructure and human capital variables are to be included in the gravity 
model. Following, Melitz (2006), Tij will take the following form: 
Equation 7 
61 
where lPii,r.:)k = 1 - n represents a vector of n symmetric bilateral trade frictions between i and j, and 
[Yk]k = 1" n represents the vector of associated elasticities or semi-elasticities. 
Equation 8 
To derive the total bilateral trade exports from country i to country j , we multiply the expenditure share 
function by the number of symmetric varieties that country i has to offer (n,). Therefore the total value of 
trade (Vlj) is: Vlj = n,slj E j .After making necessary substitutions
29 we have the following; 
Equation 9 
E 
Vlj = n,(p,rlj)'-a p'~a 
} 
I-a 1-0" EJ 
Vii = niP, Til pI-a 
} 
Equation (9) represents country i's sales to each market.Therefore, summing over all the markets will 
give us the total income for country i assuming that markets clear. This can be expressed as follows: 
Equation 10 
If we combine equations (10) and (9), we get a gravity equation expressed as follows: 
29 Substitute ( ~ }-a for s') and p'r lj for p,} from equation (9). 
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Equation 11 
if we let I R I-a E) Cr" -I -) = n, then 1=01 ~ P -17 
) 
YE V = rl_-a I J 
iJ Ij gpt-a-
) 
Equation 11 can be made to look more like the classical physics gravity equation as follows: 
yy.' 
Bilateral Trade = G ,J I' 
Cdistlj)a-
where G = n:,1-a and (distlj)"-' = I~a' 
J 'r1j 
Most recent literature has excluded the \ component and only estimated the gravity equation 
QP a 
represented by Vlj = ::~: 30 The ignored componen{n:,I_a ) includes factors that vary every year 
such as bilateral costs and GDPs. (See equation (14) above for the definition ofn ). Its exclusion 
therefore results in omitted variable biases. Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) refer to this as the "gold medal 
error" in the estimation of the gravity equation. This ignored component is what a and VanWincoop 
(2003a) calls the 'multilateral trade resistance'. Other literature refers to it as 'remoteness'. The authors 
1 
note that since I is directly correlated with trade costs (see equation (11) above), its exclusion np -a 
from estimation will bias the trade costs estimates and its determinants, and therefore they recommend 
use of time-varying country dummies to address the problem. Using the theoretical foundation of the 
gravity equation Baldwin and Taglioni (2006) identify two other mistakes which they term 'silver and 
bronze medal errors'. The silver medal mistake occurs when researchers wrongly average the trade 
flows and make use of arithmetic average(log of sums) instead of geometric average (The gravity 
equation is modelled within a CES expenditure theoretical framework, and therefore is multiplicative.) 
This problem of aggregation occurs when authors use trade data from importers and exporters in order to 
come up with one estimate of bilateral trade. However, the gravity literature has shown a tradition of 
using only import data because it has long been argued to be more accurate. Other literature has used 
30 Since the contribution of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), tl1is 'error is now widely recognized and several standard fixes are 
used to avoid it' (Baldwin & Taglioni, 2006: 11). Common measures that have been used include nation dummies, pair dummies 
which are time-invariant, and time-varying country dummies. 
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export data only. This is the approach taken in the present work. Import data is used only as mirror data 
when export figures are missing. Lastly, the bronze medal mistake stems from 'the incorrect deflation of 
trade and GOP figures' (Baldwin and Taglioni 2006: 27). 
13,4,2 Specification of the Empirical Model 
Previous studies have restricted their analysis to one or another specific TReB initiative, have narrowly 
defined TReB to cover border measures (trade facilitation), and have given limited coverage to African 
countries. Furthermore, earlier studies have either focused on institutions and trade or infrastructure and 
trade. Those studies that have extended their analysis to behind the border issues do so with exclusive 
attention either to institutions or infrastructure. Nor do they attempt comparative analysis of different 
policy mixes. The present study fills this gap by widening the definition of trade capacity to include factors 
such as human capacity and other infrastructure factors which constrain supply capacity, and by widening 
the coverage of countries by including data on many African countries. The study will make use of world 
data but include a Sub- Sahara Africa (SSA) dummy for SSA countries, excluding South Africa (SA). 
ExcluSion of SA is motivated by its extreme divergence from the pattern of African economies. By UN 
classification South Africa is a middle-income country with well developed financial, legal, 
communications, and energy and transport sectors. Its per capita GOP corrected for purchasing power 
parity position it as one of the world's fifty wealthiest countries. According to the 2006's Africa 
Development Report, South Africa's 2004 nominal GOP ($215 billion) accounted for the largest share of 
Sub-Saharan Africa's nominal GDP.Bogetic and Fedderke(2005) benchmark Saw's infrastructure 
performance on all four major infrastructure sectors, and find it to be quite comparable with other country 
groupings in terms of availability, accessibility and affordability.These factors make SA an outlier in its 
continent. In consequence of the combination of its advanced stage of development and its economiC 
size relative to other African countries, its inclusion would distort the analysis. 
To serve the study's objectives, the standard gravity model is augmented to include tariffs, proxies for 
TReB initiatives, and dummies for language, regional trade arrangements, common border, and being 
landlocked. The specification is as follOWS: 
Equation 12 
InT" = a o + b, In(l + TARIFF" ) + b, In H, + b, In F, + b4 In I, + b, In H, + b, In F, 
+b,lnl, +b.ln(GDp, )+b9 In(GDP, )+bIOPOp, +bllPOP, +b12 SSA. +bl3ln(DIST,) 
+b'4LOCK" +b15 BORD" +b'6RTA" +b17 LANG" +b"Col" +bI9 BILATERAL'f 
+ b,oSSA + 85/ 
The gravity model variables and their expected signs are described in Table 7below. 
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Table 7: Variables used in the gravity model. 
Variable 
TARIFF' 
I j , F}, Hi 















Is the value of total exports from country i to country j 
with imports of country j from i used as a mirror for missing 
data.31 
Simple Average MFN applied 
These are importing country's indicators for quality of 
institutions, infrastructure and human capital respectively 
These are exporting country's indicators for quality of 
institutions, infrastructure and human capital respectively 
Is the Gross Domestic Product 
Total population of a country in millions 
Is the geographical distance between cap~al cities of the 
importing and exporting countries. 
This is the conditional probability that two randomly drawn 
persons one from country J and I share tihe same religion. 
1 if either the exporting or importing country belongs to the SSA 
region (excluding South Africa) and a otherwise; 
1 if i country and j share a land border and a otherwise. 
1 if the exporting country is land locked and a otherwise 
1 if i and j belong to the same regional trade agreement and a 
otherwise (several regional groupings are included) 
1 if i and j have a bilateral trade agreement and a otherwise 
1 if country i and j share a common official language and a 
otherwise 
1 if i ever colonized j or vice versa, and a otherwise 
This is an error term which is assumed to be well-behaved and 















Inclusion of both exporters' and importersTRCB variables is due to the fact that a country will export more 
not only due to its own reforms, but because of reforms undertaken by its trading partners (WMO, 2004). 
The impact ofTRCB is isolated by including dummies as control variables to capture the effect of some 
similarities such as preferential trade agreements, adjacency, colonial ties, similar religion and languages. 
The model is estimated using 2005 cross-section data for 117 countries of which 24 are in sub-Sahara 
Africa. 
"we follow other work such as Wilson, Mann and Otsuki (2003 and 2005), Gamberoni and Newfarmer (2009) and 
Freund and Rocha (2010) among others that have used exports. We note, however, that other literature has used 
imports (Nordas and Piermartini 2004) while still other studies have used averages of exports and imports. There 
are various arguments around which of these approaches is best. Some data may involve under-reporting of 
imports so as to avoid duty; at the same time there is a widespread view that export data reported by developing 
countries are generally of poor quality. However, these are issues that can be investigated further through 
estimating specifications using import data and testing for statistical differences in coefficients. 
32 Regional trade agreements included are SADC non SACU, NAFTA, EU, GAFTA, ASEAN, CACAM, CARICOM, CEFTA, 
ECCNVAS, COMESA, EU, MERCOSUR, NAFTA, EFTA, CIS, SAPTA, SADC, and SACU. 
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As noted previously, discussions by Wei (1996), Deardorff (1998), Anderson and van Wincoop (2003a) 
andBaldwin & Taglioni (2006) highlight the possibility of misspecification in the standard gravity model 
due to exclusion olthe multilateral resistance or remoteness term". Ever since the contribution of 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003a) most authors have included country-fixed effects for both exporting 
and importing countries in the empirical specification and estimation of the gravity equations. Inclusion of 
country-fixed effects in our model does not permit us to assess the impact of country specific variables 
such as institutions, infrastructure and human capital on trade, as these become impossible to isolate 
once country fixed effects are incorporated. We therefore follow some other empirical literature that has 
resorted to explicitly computing and including a remoteness variable in the specification of the gravity 
equation". Different proxies have been used to capture remoteness, with some studies using weighted 
distance to all other trade partners, while others have used latitude, which is the distance from the 
equator35. The more remote are the two trading countries from their other partners, the more they are 
likely to trade with each other. According to Melitz (2007), remote countries have fewer good 
opportunities. Sachs & Warner (1997) and Rodriquez & Rodrik (1999) use distance from the tropics as an 
indication of harshness of environment and resource endowment in their growth studies. Melitz (2007) 
cites other previous studies (Frankel 1997, Wolf 1997, Helliwell 1998,Nitsch 2000),which have included 
remoteness and have ignored country fixed effects because of high (and sometimes perfect) correlation 
between remoteness and internal distance and country fixed effects. Feenstra (2004: 5-35) shows that 
results from both approaches (i.e. using fixed effects and includinga remoteness variable in the 
speCification) yield quite similar and consistent estimates, although multilateral resistance terms resulted 
in more efficient estimates. Nordas and Permartini (2004) also come to thisconclusion. 
The speCification of our equation including remoteness variables36 is as follows: 
Equation 13 
InT,; = a o +b, In(GDP, )+ b, In(GDPJ )+ b3 In Dist'J + b,SSA + b, In(1 + TARIFF, )+b, In(I + TARlFF j ) 
+b 7 In H, +h8 In F, +h9 In I, +hlO In H, +b]] In FJ +b 12 tn I) +bIlPOP, +bI4 POP j +b I5 RTA 
+ b" BILATERAL 'I + b" LOCK + b" BORD + +b"LANG + b20 Cof + b21 In fat _ exp+ b" In fat _ imp + E:~I 
Within the fixed effects model which includes both exporter and importer fixed effects our estimation 
equation is speCified as follows: 
33 See the discussion in the theoretical framework above. 
~ Remoteness has been defined as a country's market potential. 'To illustrate the role of remoteness, consider two pairs of 
countries, (i, j) and (k, I), and assume that the distance between the countries in each pair is the same (D~-=DkI) but I and j are 
closer to other countries. In this case, the most remote countries, k and I, will tend to trade more between each other because they 
do not have alternative trading partners' (Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006: 651). Helble (2005) gives an example of the distance 
between Spain and Sweden which is about the same as the distance between Australia and New Zealand but because of the 
remoteness of Australia and New Zealand from other markets they are expected to trade more with each other than Spain and 
Sweden 
3S e.g. Nord as and Piermartini, (2004) used absolute latitude of the two trading partners. 
3e We use the absolute latitude of a country. 
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Equation 14 
1nT.; = llo +b, In(GDp' )+b2In(GD~ )+b3InDis~, +b,SSA+b, In(l + TARIFf)+b.ln(l + TARIFlj) 
+b, InH, +bs InF, +1>" In1, +qo InH, +q,lnF; +q,ln1, + q,POp, + b14PoI; +b"RTA +bl .B1LATE 
+bIlLOCK+b18BO~+bI9LANGt-b,oCol+b'ILP, +b"ID, +C~I 
where D, and Dj capture exporter's and importer's fixed effects respectively. 
13.4.3 Control for Sample Selection Bias 
Other recent research usingthe gravity model focuses on the problem of zero bilateral trade flows - a 
problem that appears most starkly in the basic log-linear gravity model sketched above. A potential 
sample selection problem arisesfrom the fact than:; is observed only for countries which trade with each 
other. This implies that bilateral trading partners are non-random, and hence not representative of all 
countries. Trading countries are divided into two groups, one group consisting of X, countries for which 
we have all the information on both regressors and regressand (trade flows), and the second group 
consistingof X, countries for which we have information on only regressors but not on the regressand 
(trade flows). Can we therefore estimate the gravity model using only X, countries and ignoring the X,? 
The omission of zero observations represents a non-random screening of the data that may lead to 
biased or inconsistent estimates. According to Green (1981) (cited in Coe et ai, 2002) the size of bias if 
variables are normally distributed is inversely proportional to the share of the sample size included in the 
regression, implying that the smaller the share of observation the greater the bias. Gujarati (2003) also 
notes that OLS estimates of parameters obtained from estimating X, observations will be biased and 
inconsistent. However, estimating the model using all the observations will also encounter an estimation 
problem since the conventional log-linear formulation of the gravity equation is incompatible with the 
inclusion ofzeros in the trade data (since the logarithm of zero is undefined.) 
To address the problem, a majority of empirical studies have simply dropped pairs with zero trade from 
the data set while other authors have substituted zero values by an arbitrarily chosen small constant 
(usually 1) and hence estimated the model using In(Tlj + \) as the dependent variable instead ofln(Tlj)' 
Some recent literature (such as Rose (2004) and Anderson and Marcouiller (2002)) has estimated the 
gravity equation using the censored regression model (Tobit estimator). 'The Tobit model describes a 
situation in which part of the observations on the dependent variable is censored (unobservable) and 
represented instead by mapping them to a specific value, generally zero' (Linders and de Groot, 2006: 4). 
Heckman (1979) showed that this selection bias problem reduces to the omitted variable problem, and he 
therefore proposes inclusion of appropriate conditioning variables which determine the partiCipation 
probability. 
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Helpman, Melitz and Rubestein(2006) adopts a two-step procedure proposed by Heckman(1979) to 
address the problem of zero trade, and this is the approach taken in the present study. Step 1 of the 
procedure is to estimate a probit model that estimates the probability that a country pair engages in trade. 
The argument here is that there are some variables or characteristics which influence countries' decisions 
on whether or not to trade with each other but does not affect the volume oftheir trade. In the second 
step the standard gravity model is then estimated by adding to it a variable (called the inverse Mills ratio 
or the hazard rate) that is derived from the probit estimate (Gujarati 2003). The implication is that sample 
selection bias is corrected by including an estimate of the missing variables (determinants of the trade 
decision) in the specification of the bilateral trade flows. 
Heckman's two-step Heckit procedure we use is based on following two latent variable sub-models: 
YI = aX + III (i) 
y, = l[bZ + 11, > 0] (ii) 
where y, is the binary trade flow indicator, which takes the value of 1 if trade occurs and 0 otherwise. 
Assumptions 
a. X, Z, y, are always observed. y, is observed only when y, =1 37; 
b. ( III , 11,) are error terms which are jOintly normally distributed, independent of X and Z, 
with zero expectation, 
c. 11 '"'Normal (0,1) 
Equation (i) shows how the value of exports is influenced by different factors affecting bilateral trade. 
Equation (ii) is the selection equation and it 'gives some insight into why trade occurs at all between two 
partner countries' (Francois and Manchin, 2006: 10) 
Following Wooldridge (2004: 563), 'since YI is observed only when y, = I , what we hope to estimate is 
E(YIIX,y, = I) along with P(Y, = IIX).,3. 
Procedure 
a. Using all N observations in the sample obtain the probit estimate <5 from the equation 
P(Y, = IIX,) = oX + 11, (iii) ; 
where the X variables are the gravity model variables explained above. After getting the results we 
A A 
compute the selection correction term (inverse Mills ratio) A'" A(X, 0), at least for i=1,2, .... N; 
which is then included as an additional regressor in the gravity equation. 
b. Obtain PI and Y'l from the OLS regression on the selected sample, 
31 Country pairs have to make the decision to trade first for bilateral trade flows between them to be observed. 




These estimators are consistent and IN -asymptotically normal (Wooldridge, 2001: 563). 
Therefore for the sample selection model the following is specified 
Equation 15 
InT; =ao +blln(GDp')+b2In(GDlJ)+b,lnDis~J +b,SSA+b, InQ+TARIFf)+b6InQ+TARIFf) 
+b,lnH, +b.lnF, +b9InI, +blO InHJ +bllln~ +b12 1nIJ +b13POp,+bI4POlJ+bl,RTA 
+~6LOCK+~,BORDr+bl.LANGt&JI 
and for the selection equation we assume that y, is observed when we have: 
Equation 16 
InT; = ao +b1 In(GDp, )+b, In(GDlJ) +b, InDis~ +b,SSA+b, InQ + TARIFf)+b6InQ + TARIFf) 
+b,lnH, +bg InF, +b9Inl, +blO InHJ +bllln~ +b1,lnIJ +bI3POp,+bl.POlJ +b1,RTA 
+bI6LOCK+b17BORDr+b"LANGtbI9Col+b20 ReI +&~I 
In this selection equation, religion (Rei) is used as an identification variable, following Helpman et al 
(2006). They define the common religion variable as the probability that two randomly drawn persons, 
one from each country, share the same religion'"' They find empirically that shared religion significantly 
affects the probability that two countries engage in trade but has a negligible effect on trade volumes. 
Finally, we estimate equation (17) below (where "ST", the selectivity term is included as an additional 
variable). 
Equation 17 
InT; =ao +b1 In(GDp' )+b, In(GDlJ)+b,lnDis~J +b.SSA+b, InQ +TARIFf)+b6 InQ + TARIFf) 
+b,lnH, +bg InF, +b9InI, +blO InHJ +bllln~ +b12 1nIJ +b13POp,+bl,POlJ+~,RTA 
+bI6LOCK+bl,BORDr+blgLANGtbI9Col+b20ST +&~I 
In order to test the stability of our results we undertake robustness tests. The gravity model is then 
estimated using different constructions of the composite indices. To do this we follOW the approach of 
Francois and Manchin (2007), and regress the indices ofTRCB on gross domestic product and 
38 "For example if country A has 40 percent Christians and country B has 20 percent, we obtain 0.08" (Helble, 2005, p.16 
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population. We then take the residuals as representative of deviations from income conditional expected 
values for each of the three indices and use them in Equation 18. 
Equation 18 
In IndexTRcB, = ao + a, In GD?" + In PO?" + e" 
Adopting this methodology ensures that we are no longer comparing countries at different levels of 
development, and secondly helps us correct the likely multicollinearity problem because the proxies 
ofTRCB are dependent on level of income. It is however, worthy noting that apart from averaging primary 
variables into aggregate indicators as done in this thesis there other approaches that have been used to 
deal with the likely problem of multicolinearity within sub-components that arises when choosing 
indicators from broad variables. Francois and Manchin (2007) employ principal component analysis to 
constructinstitutional and infrastructure measuresbased on the first two components of each aspect. 
According to Vyas and Kumaranaye (2006:460) this is "a multivariate statistical technique used to reduce 
the number of variables in a data set into smaller number of 'dimensions'". Portugal-Perez and Wilson 
(2010:3) make use of factor analysis,a modelling technique that explains the correlation among a set of 
observed variables through an unobserved common factor. Apart from this thesis, averaging of sub-
indicators has also been applied by Wilson, Mann and Otsuki (2003, 2005). All these approaches (simple 
average, principal component analysis and factor analySis) are ways of reducing the dimensionality of the 
data by aggregating highly correlated indicators into a single indicator. The major difference between the 
approach adopted in this thesis (averaging sub-indicators) and the other two is the assumption made 
about the weights assigned to individual sUb-components. In taking a simple average, we are impliciltly 
assuming equal weights (which is a potential weakness of the approach) for all sub-indicators whereas 
some other approaches calculate weights. 
We further compare our results with those obtained from alternative ways of dealing with zero trade 
values. In this case we first estimate the gravity model using the Tobit estimation and secondly we drop 
the pairs with zero trade from the data set and estimate the log linearity by OLS and compare the results. 
In addition we explore the issue of complementarity of policies by introducing interaction terms of our 
TRCB indicators. 
We also test the sensitivity of the results to trade flows according to geographical partner. For example, 
we compare SSA flows with developed and with developing regions. 
While the estimated coeffiCients give us different partial impacts of our explanatory variables on trade, 
they do not directly give us the opportunity cost ofTRCB indicators. To be able to evaluate this we follow 
Wilson et. ai's (2003) approach and make use of policy simulations. We examine scenarios that focus on 
improved institutions, infrastructure and human trade-related capacity in Sub-Sahara Africa and compare 
70 
these with matched conditions for the rest of the world. In these policy simulations, the world's average 
level is used as the baseline for each of the composite indicators. 
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3.5 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
In the following sub-sections a number of research questions posed earlier are answered through an 
estimation of the Heckman two-step model. 
3.5.1 Does TReB Matter in Determining Trade Flows? 
Given the limited availability of donor funds, TRCB resources should be prioritized in such a way as to 
produce greatest benefit. This section aims to shed light on the relative importance ofTRCB in the 
determination of bilateral trade flows. To examine more rigorously the extent to which trade-related 
capacity building indicators impact on bilateral trade flows, a gravity equation for bilateral trade was 
estimated using trade patterns in 2005. As indicated earlier, the data were obtained from the UN 
COMTRADE database, the World Bank's Doing Business Report, and the World Economic Forum's 
Competitiveness survey (2005, 2006), among other sources40. The decision to make use of cross-
sectional datawas based partly on the fact that the main variables of interest do not vary greatly on a 
year-to- year basis. Therefore cross sectional variations among countries in these variables should 
account for any differences they generate in bilateral trade flows. We use the following standard gravity 
model in our estimation, where the variables are described in detail in Table Appendix 5: 
Equation 19 
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We extend the model to include trade related capacity building indicators, and tariffs. Following WMO 
(2005) we use the TRCB indicators to capture unobserved country specific effects for both exporters and 
importers. An extended gravity equation that excludes all TRCB variables was first estimated using 
Heckman's two-step selection model. Table 8 below presents the estimation results". These jOintly 
estimate a selection equation which determines the probability that two countries engage in trade (Probit 
equation).A regression model determines the bilateral trade flows. The selection equation uses the same 
explanatory variables as the regression equation,along with at least one identification variable. Following 
4(J Appendix 5 give a full description of variables used in this thesis and their data sources. 
41 The table only reports results for the regression equation. Selection results for specifications 1-4 are available from the author 
upon request. 
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Helpmanet al (2006)we use religion as the variable in question. To justify this choice, we estimate both 
the regression and probit equations separately using standard gravity variables and common religion. 
Our findings show that the religion variable is not a significant variable in the trade flow regression 
equation but positively and Significantly determines the probability that two countries will engage in trade 
(see results in Appendix 7). This forms the basis for omitting the common religion variable from the main 
regression equation and for its use as a selection variable in the selection equation. The first column of 
results in Table 1 below presents the standard gravity equation augmented by a number of dummies 
capturing membership in a common regional trade agreement, common official language, and existence 
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Model 1 estimates the gravity equation without all TRCB variables and tariffs. Then in model 2 importer's 
and exporter's simple average tariff ratesare added into the equation. Models 3, 4 and 5 estimate TRCB 
variables individually while in model 6 we enter the different categories ofTRCB simultaneously. Results 
show that an increase in tariffs (for either the importing or exporting country) has a negative effect on 
exports, in conformity to theoretical expectations. The finding on tariffs is robust to changes in model 
specification. Also, in line with other gravity model studies of bilateral trade we find that increases in GDP 
of the importer or the exporter positively and significantly affect trade:a 1 % increase in exporter GDP 
raises bilateral trade on average by about 1.3%, while raising the GDP of the importing country by 1 per 
cent increases trade volume (less than proportionately) by about 0.99 per cent. We note that before 
tariffs are included importers have approximately unity elasticity, which is reduced by inclusion of tariffs. 
Inclusion of tariff variables improves the explanatory power of population variables (both importer's and 
exporter's) which are now significant at 1 percent level of significance. The impact of the border dummy 
is also slightly improved when tariffs and TRCB variables are included in the regression equation. This is 
probably pointing to theborder variable capturing the trade opportunities available to bordering countries, 
which are better accounted for by trade policy (tariffs). While most papers do not include tariffs in their 
analysis, our results show that omission of tariffs may result in omitted variable biases. The sample of 
countries used in the data does not representa free trading block, so its members do not have 
harmonized tariff policies. Therefore omission of tariffs would result in an upward bias of the coefficients 
of GDP.Of interest to our hypothesis testing is the coefficient on the SSA dummy which is estimated to be 
negative and significant at 1 % percent level. The implication of the results is that SSA countries' trade 
with the rest of the world is approximately 34%42 less than other countries as a function of their 'being 
African'; see further explaination in Section 3.5.8. 
Model 6 shows results in which all the three TRCB variables have been included. The full two-step 
selection results of the model are presented in Appendix 9.The results show that the same variables 
explain both the trade volumes and the probability that country i exports to country j. In almost all cases 
the impact goes in the same direction with the exception of the effect of tariffs, population and common 
border. Both importers' and exporters' tariffs reduce the volume of trade but increase the probability of 
trading.A common border raises trade volumes but reduces the probability of trading. Helpman (2006) 
attributes this counterintuitive finding to the effectsof territorial border conflicts. Both exporter and 
importer GDP still yield strong results with very high significance levels. However, inclusion ofTRCB 
variables in the gravity model reduces the impact of exporter GDP by 50%.The elasticity drops from 1.2% 
to 0.6%. A main insight from these results is that once all the three TRCBindicators are controlled there 




for policy analysis and simulations. The results also show a higher magnitude for the exporters' TRCB 
indices, indicating the importance of country's own trade related capacity building in improving export 
performance. Despite the counterintuitive sign on exporters' institutions the results in model 6 do 
highlight the importance ofTRCB in determining trade flows. 
13.5.2 Role ofinstitutions 
We estimate a third speCification (model 3) in which the standard gravity model controls for institutions 
only. In this estimation coefficients on institutions are intuitively signed and significant. A 10% 
improvement in the quality of institutions will see exporters increasing trade by about 16%, while 
importers will increase by 8%. Quite surprising, though, is the increase in the point estimate of the SSA 
dummy. Once we control for human capital and infrastructure, the institution coefficient on the exporters' 
institutions is counterintuitive as it becomes negative and significant, while the coefficient on the 
importers' institutions is positive and insignificant. This finding on institutions is quite surprising; we 
expected the institution coefficient to be pos~ive with very high significance levels,in light of the recent 
emphasis in theoretical development literature and in policy studies. According to Easterly (2001), 
repeated failures of development approaches derived from neoclassical theory recurrently result from 
ineffective institutions of any country, which vary from country to country. This could be the reason the 
institutions variable, which is a composite index of various different sub-indicators, is not behaving as 
expected. In addition, according to Jansen and Nordas (2004), lack of robustness of the institutions 
variable might indicate that institutions matter less to foreign trade than they do to direct foreign 
investment where more commitment and sunk costs are involved. Foreign markets can be serviced 
through exports and foreign direct investment (FDI); therefore, to access economies with poor institutions 
investors rely more on exports than on FDI. This proposition supports the negative and significant 
relationship between exporters' institutions and bilateral trade flows revealed in our results 
It must be noted that, compared to literature on institutions and growth there is little research so far on the 
impact of institutions on trade, hence the scarcity of theoretical arguments linking institutions and trade. 
However, economic development practitioners have argued that it is institutions in trading partners that 
matter in determining bilateral trade flows, with similarity of institutions predicting larger flows. The 
rationale is that institutional similarity both reflects and promotes familiarity of cultural norms and business 
practices. Linder (1961) was the first to introduce similarity between countries as abooster of trade, 
though his explanation was based on demand. More recently the argument is that similarity among rich 
countries goes beyond demand but also entails similarity of institutions. de Groot et.al (working paper) 
using 1998 data of OECD countries attributes the disproportionate trade among OECD members to 
similarity and high quality of institutions. Our presumption is that countries with similar institutions will 
trade more as institutional homogeneity will reduce transaction costs between them. We therefore extend 
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the gravity equation with a variable to reflect the effect of institutional homogeneity. To get this variable to 
reflect institutional similarity we take deviations between the log of exporters and importers indicesof 
institutional quality. The smaller the deViation the more homogenous is the quality of institutions between 
the two trading partners Once similarity of institutional quality is controlled for, we observe that 
institutions become intuitively signed and very significant (Results are reported in Appendix 9). The 
results show a negative and very significant relationship between bilateral flows and differences in 
institutional quality. According to the results a 10% increase in the gap in institutional quality between 
trading partners will depress bilateral trade flows between them by about 3%.43 Controlling for institutional 
homogeneity in model 3 (where only institutions are controlled for)also results in a lower point 
estimate440f the SSA dummy. These findings lend credence to the view that the marginalization of SSA 
from the multilateral trading system is partly due to its institutional divergence from the rest of the world, 
implying, therefore, that SSA will trade more with the rest of the world if institutional differences are 
reduced. However, this is an area which requires further research to determine minimum levels of 
institutions required for trade to take place. This is particularly so given the institutional homogeneity 
among Sub-Saharan African countries (Similarity in the poor quality of their institutions) thatmight be 
predicted, to increase trade among them but has not yet done so. 
To explore in detail the institutional impact on bilateral trade flows we estimate our regression model 
using individual components of the institution index. The results are summarized in Appendix 8 and they 
reveal different institutional capacity building needs between importing and exporting countries. However, 
not all of the individual components are significant and have the expected signs - this might be an 
indication that the proxies used to capture institutions may not be the appropriate ones or the quality of 
data is poor. We therefore focus on those components that are intuitive. According to the results,for 
exporting countries to boost bilateral trade flows they requirethe presence of demanding regulatory 
standards and universitylindustry research collaboration. Results show that a 10% improvement in 
standards on products and services by exporters will boost bilateral trade flows by approximately 17%, 
while similar improvement in the collaboration in research between industry and local universities - or 
whatever basket of institutional changes this proxies - will result in about a 4% increase in bilateral trade 
flows. Findings on the importance of standards to exporters is in line with current world developments, in 
which technical regulations and standards issues are increaSingly becoming vital following the continued 
decline in tariff barriers. It is increasingly difficult for companies to sell in foreign markets when national 
and intemational standards are very divergent. This has prompted many countries to adopt poliCies 
aimed at enhancing international harmonization. 
43 de Groot et.a! (2004) report a similar finding. 
44 -0.35 compared to -0.54 when only the quality of institutions is controlled for. 
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It is possible that the institutions index does poorly in the regressions due to a potential endogeneity 
problem astrade leads to convergence of institutions. Countries may have high quality institutions 
because they trade more rather than the other way round. Some authors have argued that competition 
through foreign trade cleans up institutional deficits (Ades and Oi Tella 1999, Anderson and van Wincoop 
2003a, and Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson2005). Freund and Rocha (2010:3) have tried to address 
the possibility that more trade leads to improved trade facilitation by examining the effect of trade 
facilitation on trade in new products, arguing that new products have no impact on the historical 
development of trade facilitation infrastructure and bereaucracy. Secondly, these authors make use of an 
instrumental variable approach and examine the impact of requirements in transit countries on exports 
from landlocked countries, the rationale being that trade facilitation in the transit country is exogenous to 
the landlocked country. The authors find that coefficients of their variables fall considerably when trade in 
new products is used to address the endogeneity problem. All the different ways to examine the effects 
of various trade delays on trade flows used in Freund and Rocha (2010) confirms the importance of trade 
facilitation in stimulating trade in Africa. Ojankov et al (2006) examine the time costs on volumes of 
exports; and also note the possibility of double causation whereby trade may also affect trade facilitation. 
This is particularly plausible given that the marginal value of investing in trade facilitation is higher when 
trade volumes are high. To address this potential endogeneity problem the authors use the number of 
required signatures for exports to take place and number of signatures for imports to take place as 
instruments for trading time. The intuition here is that bureaucratic processes directly affect the number 
of days for export processing, but are unlikely to be affected by the total volume of trade. Overall, their 
general finding is that increase in trading time reduces trade flows; and using instrumental variables 
increases the coefficient on trading time slightly. It is possible that, in the absence of an appropriate 
instrumental variable the actualimpact of institutions on trade might not be properly accounted for and 
there could be some biases in the coefficients. The authors also use a 'difference-in-difference' technique 
to address endogeneity issues and evaluate the effect of time delays on the relative exports of countries 
with similar endowments and geography, and which face the same tariffs in importing countries (Ojankov 
et ai, 2006:3). Portugal-Perez, Alberto and Wilson (2010),who estimate the impact of aggregate indicators 
of "soft" and "hard" infrastructure on the export performance of developing countries, address 
potentialreverse causality in three ways. Firstly they employ an approach adopted by Francois and 
Manchini (2007) and regress trade facilitation on income per capita and population and then use the 
unexplained residuals to proxy for the trade facilitation indicators. Secondly, trade facilitation indicators are 
instrumented by their 3-year lagged value. Lastly, they examine effects of trade facilitation indicators on 
new products. 
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From our analysis it is not far fetched to conclude that, institutions are highly complicated and inter-
country differences in economic and social structures, property rights, rule of law and so on rule out any 
parsimonious account of institutions that influence trade flows in SSA. However, some generalizations 
can be made although their individual weights will vary different national contexts. For example, property 
rights and efficiency of the legal system vary widely, but the general principle is that property rights must 
be secure, transparent and enforceable by law (UNCTAD 2009). 
13,5.3 Role of Human Capital 
Model 4 controls for human capital only and results reveal that the quality of human capital variable has 
different impactson importers and exporters, and is also less Significant to importers than to exporters. A 
1 % improvement in the quality of human capital is estimated to boost exporters' trade flows by 
approximately 2.8%. When other TRCB indicators are controlled for importers' human capital quality has 
a negative and significant effect on bilateral trade: a 1 percent improvement in the quality of human 
capital in an importing country will result in approximately 0.5 percent decrease in its imports. We expect 
this to be the case, assuming that as countries develop their human capital more they can produce more 
(espeCially intermediate inputs). Therefore, this increase in the range of consumption and investment 
goods produced domestically will translate to fewer imports. This assumption is based on the empirically 
documented understanding that in the early stages of development which are also associated with low 
quality of human capital, economies rely more on imports especially for manufactured intermediate 
goods. We therefore expect the effect to be greater for imported manufactured intermediate goods than 
for primary goods. This hypothesis can be tested by estimating the differential impact of human capital 
on different classes of exports, i.e. primary and manufactured exports. Our estimation using 
manufactured exports supports this speculation, and shows that a 1 % improvement in the quality of 
human capital now results in a greater and more significant decrease in the imports of manufactured 
goods (1.2%, more than double the 0.5% decline in the total exports equation). The differential impact of 
human capital on imports of primary goods becomes very small (0.01 %) and insignificant when we use 
primary exports in our estimation45. In line with this finding, Wood & Mayer (2001) also find that Africa's 
export structure is caused by a combination of low levels of education and abundant resources - and they 
conclude that achievement of high skill per worker could shift comparative advantage into manufactures 
and services. 
45 Results of the differential impact of human capital on different classes of exports are not reported here, 
but are available from the author on request. I recognize, however, the importance of pursuing investigation along 
those lines given the dominant position of natural resources in African exports. 
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On the other hand, quality of exporters' human capital enhances bilateral trade - a 1 percent 
improvement in human capital quality will boost exports by about 1.4%. We expected this kind of 
relationship given that as human capacities increase economies are better placed to produce more and 
hence export more; this could be a specifically African scenario given the production constraints faced by 
African countries. Otherwise for developed countries we see increase in both exports and imports .. 
Empirically it has been shown that economic activity is positively related to exports. Compared to results 
for model 3 (with institutions only), model 5 (with infrastructure only) and model 6 (will all TRCe 
indicators), contrOlling for human capital only results in the lowest point estimate on the coefficient on 
SSA dummy (-0.318). It may be inferred from this finding that improvement in the quality of human capital 
seems to be the most important aspect ofTRCe for SSA countries. 
We also take note that given the broad definition for human capacity used here,it is possiblethat two-way 
causality obtains (like in the case of institutions). 
13.5.4 Role ofInfrastructure 
Models 5 and 6 show estimation results which control for infrastructure separately and with other TRCe 
indicators respectively. The infrastructure measure retains its significance when other TRCe variables 
are controlled for. In both specifications results confirm the importance of the quality of infrastructure in 
determining bilateral trade flows. In terms of coefficient values, infrastructure is the most important of all 
the TRCe indicators, with exporters' infrastructure being the most significant with an elasticity of 
approximately 3.0 (implying an increase of 3% in bilateral trade flows for each 1 % improvement in the 
quality of exporters' infrastructure). The estimated coefficient of the SSA dummy is reduced to -0.37 
(approximately 31% less trade flows) when only infrastructure is controlled for, from -0.41 (34% less trade 
flows) when all TRCe indicators are not included in the estimation. This result suggests that some aspect 
of SSA's marginalization in the global economy is due to its quality of infrastructure, which is below the 
world's average quality. 
13.5.5 Role of other Variables 
Other gravity variables (such as presence of colonial ties, bilateral trade agreement, and common border) 
in the equation are significant with expected signs. Distance exerts the greatest depressing effect on 
bilateral trade. The negative impact of distance on bilateral trade is intuitive and has been confirmed by 
many other studies. It is widely argued that as distance between two trading countries increases 
transportation and communication costs increase, negatively affecting the magnitude of bilateral trade. 
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The coefficient on distance is quite robust and unaffected by inclusion of other variables in the gravity 
equation, confirming the importance of trade costs in determining bilateral trade flows". 
Our analysis also takes into account regional effects by controlling for various regional trade agreements 
(see Appendix 4 for membership of these RTAs). The objective here is to measure trade patterns within 
regional groupings which are not captured by gravity variables. Estimation results show that most of 
them are positive and statistically significant. Also included in the estimation is a dummy variable 
capturing the existence of any bilateral trade agreement. Our results suggest trade promoting effects 
ofsuch agreements, as expected. However, quite puzzling is the negative and insignificant impact of EU 
and NAFT A membership, which seems to suggest that membership in these regional groupings depress 
trade. However, exploring this a little bit further, results show that in the first two specifications without 
both tariffs and TRCB variables jOint EUmembership raises bilateral trade flows. After controlling for 
institutions, infrastructure, human capital and tariffs, EU countries in particular will have lower trade than 
expected. de Groot et.al (2003) found a similar result on jointOECD membership once institutions were 
controlled for and he concluded that rich countries trade more due to their effective institutions. However, 
given the multifarious membership of the EU de Groot et. ai's finding does not seem to be main factor 
behind this relationship, hence the absence of tariffs is a plausible explanation. 
Despite issues of occasionally insignificant results and sometimes counterintuitive coefficients, overall, 
the empirical estimates show that TRCB does matter in the determination of bilateral trade flows; and 
lower human capital has the greatest negative impact on SSA countries (which trade 27% less than 
countries from other regions)47. However, given that qualities of institutions, human capital and 
infrastructure were calculated as simple averages of the sub-indicators, results must be interpreted with 
caution. 
13.5.6 Comparison with Existing Literature 
We compare our results with findings from earlier literature that looked at similar issues. Table 9 
highlights some of the major findings. It is important to note that TRCB variables have been measured 
differently by different authors, with some restricting infrastructure to just port/roads while other papers 
used an aggregated index for these variables with varying individual indicators. This makes comparison 
across different studies difficult. However looking at the main gravity variables (GDP for exporter and 
importer, distance, adjacency and tariffs) the results of this paper are within the range of previous studies. 
The conventional gravity model suggests that GDP and adjacency boost trade while tariffs and distance 
depress exports. Even though different data sets were used in the results indicated in Table 9, qualitative 
46 Distance serves as a proxy for the size of transportation costs and also reflects other distances related trade costs. 
" =(EXP(-O.318)-1)"100 
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We estimate 7 different specifications to incorporate these issues and the results are reported in 
Table 13. Results for the fixed effects model are presented in the last three columns oITable 13.0n 
comparison, the standard gravity model underestimates the importance of tariffs, GDP and distance, 
which are estimated to have a larger effect in the fixed effects modelthat uses bilateral TRCe 
variables. The impact of bilateral trade agreements is also exaggerated; which the standard gravity 
model estimates to result in 24% more trade compared to 12% in the fixed effects model. 
Replacing importers' trade facilitation variables with importers' fixed effects as in Wilson, Mann and 
Otsuki (2005) yields estimated coefficients oITRCe variables which are quite similar to our standard 
gravity equation estimates. The distance estimate and elasticities are also virtually the same. 
Next we follow literature that has used latitude to capture remotenessfrom major markets (Nordas and 
Piermartini, 2004) and estimate our gravity equation including a remoteness term.The results appear 
in column 6 oITable 13. The estimated coefficients for tariffs, GDP, TRCe and distance do not differ 
much from those presented earlier. Despite the quantitative changes in some estimates the 
qualitative effects do not change in comparison to the standard gravity equation (without both country-
fixed effects and remoteness term) as represented in equation 1with results in column 2. Institutions 
continue to be a problem with the coefficient for importers' institutions being insignificant while the 
exporters' institutions coefficient takes a wrong sign (and is Significant). In terms of coefficient values, 
quality of infrastructure continues to exert the greatest impact on bilateral trade. The estimated 
coefficients of latitude show that a 1 percent increase in the latitudewill on average depress export 
performance by 0.16%. This finding is counter-intuitive. One might naturally expect that as two 
trading countries become more isolated from all major markets bilateral trade flows between them 
should increase. However,despite the intuitiveness of using latitude to proxy for a 
country'sgeographic position relative to all other countries, the existing literature does not provide 
much discussion of the issue .. 
Now turning to the issue of zero trade flows, we first use the ordinary least squares estimation which 
we apply on the set of explanatory variables employed in the original selection model on a sample 
excluding the zero bilateral trade values. The results, shown in column 4, are not Significantly 
different than those obtained from the previous speCification. Just as in the selection model, all the 
other TRCe variables with the exception of institutions are in line with theoretical predictions. The 
institutions variables are still not behaving as expected, with both importers' and exporters' institutions 
coefficients being negative. As before, the variable measuring the quality of exporters' infrastructure 
is statistically the most significant among the TReB variables. Like in the selection model, tariffs, 
country's income (as measured by GDP), country's size (population), presence of colonial ties and 
common official language, and existence of bilateral trade between two trading partners are 
Significantly important in explaining bilateral trade flows. However, looking at the magnitudes of the 
coefficients shows that most of the OLS estimates are underestimated compared to sample selection 
estimates. This is in line with concern noted in the literature that if reduced trade is due to other 
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An overall implication of our findings is that a one-size-fits-all approach to TRCBis inefficient as there 
are different TRCB needs between regions. Therefore any attempt to evaluate the impact ofTRCB 
has to take into account interrelationships among condnions and trade capacities. This then raises 
questions about the adequacy of existing standard theoretical growth and trade models to adequately 
accommodate complexities arising from such interrelationships. In the next chapter this argument is 
explored using both growth and trade models. 
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CHAPTER 4 
IMPLICATION OF TRADE-RELATED CAPACITY BUILDING ON OVERALL DEVELOPMENT 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Although attempts have been made to evaluate trade capacity building programmes with respect to 
policy formulation and implementation, little has been done to assess the effectiveness ofTRCB policy 
options in promoting growth, or to evaluate an optimal balance between trade-related and general 
investment from this perspective. There is a dearth of research articles that employ rigorous 
quantitative methods to analyze information and/or support arguments related to TRCB. In view of 
this limitation in existing studies, there is need for quantitative studies that specifically investigate the 
opportunity costs of different TRCS programmes on overall development as measured by growth. 
However, using the existing trade-growth models we cannot address some fundamental questions 
that may arise from assessment of a trade promotion policy as a development lever. For instance, 
existing models do not adequately account for complementarity between infrastructure, human capital 
and institutions, which are particularly relevant for the TRCS initiatives. 
We therefore, argue in this chapter that theoretical propositions about trade-growth linkages are 
inadequate to address the dynamiCS in TRCS policy. Evaluating the growth impact of trade generally 
or TRCS in particular therefore requires some degree of modification of existing standard trade-
growth models. For example, there are wide varieties ofTRCS activities on offer to least developed 
countries. Furthermore, empirical findings in Chapter 3 indicate the importance of interactions of 
these TRCB policy mixes. For instance, in the SSA region complementing infrastructure and human 
capital will bring the greatest bilateral trade boost. Therefore,using standard trade-growth models will 
limit our ability to engage in deep policy analysis and evaluate how these different TRCB policy mixes 
affect trade andlor growth. 
This chapter will extend existing models of trade and growth toaccount for the impact ofTRCB. These 
models are then used to explore the implications olthe empirical findings in Chapter 3 on traditional 
trade-growth links. A standard endogenous growth model, augmented by public investment as 
proposed by Barro (1990) and Grossman and Helpman (1991) model will be used in the analysiS. 
Although this chapter borrows heavily from growth and trade literature, it is beyond the scope of the 
chapter to present an exhaustive discussion of the growth-trade relationship. This is an issue which 
has been subject to intensive research and consensus seems to have emerged that, indeed, growth 
is positively associated with trade. In particular, the argument that rapid growth in Asian developing 
economies is due to outward-oriented policies has gained broad acceptance. 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 briefly presents the standard 
theoretical argument for the trade-growth link. While traditional trade theory proposes that trade 
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positively impacts economic development, the empirical literature has not yielded conclusive findings 
(Davis and Weinstein 2002). Sub-section 4.2.1 highlights various channels through which trade 
affects growth. One source is technological spillovers and knowledge transfers from trade. There is 
empirical evidence to show a positive impact of intemational trade on technical progress through 
increased foreign competition. Sub-section 4.2.2 reviews an extension of the endogenous growth 
model to take account of public investment. The analysis here borrows heavily from Barro (1990), 
who incorporates a public sector into a simple, constant-returns model of growth and derives a 
balanced growth path. After making the assumption that trade-related investment is a form of public 
investment, we recommend adoption of a CES-translog function as proposed by Dewan and Min 
(1996) and extend Barro's framework to highlight the likely impact ofTRCB on growth. Section 4.3 
concludes the thesis. 
4.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
14.2.1 Trade-Growth Link Theoretical Arguments 
The proposition that trade is an important driver of economic growth is not new in economic literature. 
Smith ian, Ricardian and Hecksher-Ohlin models form the main roots of the theoretical literature on 
trade and growth. These traditional theories share the conclusion that international trade leads to 
higher welfare than autarky. Openness to trade contributes to the following sources of growth: growth 
in inputs of production, improvement in the efficiency of allocation of inputs across activities, 
innovation that creates new products and new uses for existing products, and increases in the 
productivity of inputs (Jayne 2001). According to Helble, Mann and Wislon (2009:1) an expansion in 
trade, investment and production opportunities leads to income growth which will in tum enhance 
development. 
These traditional theories, along with the development of other new trade theories, are discussed 
briefly in Chapter 2, section 2.2. What is evident from this discussion is that the explanatory power of 
traditional trade theories is fairty limited, thus leading to a search for new insights and approaches. 
Traditional theories focus on static allocative gains from trade and overlook dynamic gains. For 
example, standard trade models are based on zero transport costs. They make the assumption that 
the capacity exists to structurally change the economy and engage in international trade. Even those 
models including tariff policies make these assumptions. Assumptions of traditional theories have 
frequently proven empirically inadequate, as the removal of policy barriers to trade does not 
necessarily increase trade flows unless other capacity constraints are removed. 
To further understand the theoretical support for any influence of trade on growth we must tum to the 
more recent endogenous growth models, which argue that the growth process is part and parcel of an 
economic system, and hence not an exogenously determined process as in older theories (Strydom 
2005). In the context of trade and growth, these models emphasise that trade works as a conduit of 
knowledge spillovers, which in tum enable an economy to achieve increasing returns. Jayme 
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(2001:8) notes that, these ' ... models have found in Total Factor Productivity (TFP) and the 
accumulation of knowledge channels to relate trade and grow1h'. These recent developments in 
grow1h theory have considered various sources of long-run grow1h, each of which involves a positive 
extemality associated with some activity. Examples include human capital accumulation through 
either learning by doing or education and technological advance through R&D activities. Trade 
affects grow1h through its effect on the level of these activities. Theory identifies at least three main 
channels through which trade yields gains for growth: exploitation of comparative advantage; flow of 
ideas, knowledge and technologies; and discoveryof new ways of doing things. 
14.2.2 Trade-Growth Empirical literature 
I 
The trade-grow1h nexus has been explored in many empirical studies such as Balassa (1985), Ben-
David (1993), Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000), Frankel and Romer (1999), Dollar and Kraay (2002) and 
Warner (2003), among others. However, the hypothesis of the trade-grow1h link has not gone w1thout 
debate as questions of causality remain unresolved. Because of the possible existence of a two-way 
link between trade and grow1h it has been difficult to gain conclusive evidence on the nature of this 
link, resulting in conflicting views. Although rapid globalization is often seen as indicative of the 
importance of international trade to grow1h (Hassam 2005), findings on the impact of intemational 
trade on grow1h have not been very persuasive as a moderate pos~ive relationship has been found. 
One of the most influential papers on the trade and grow1h debate is Dollar (1992), which tested the 
relationship between grow1h and measures of outward orientation. Dollar ran a regression of grow1h 
in per capita income in 95 countries averaged over the period 1976-85 on trade distortion and 
exchange rate volatility measures as well as on the rate of investment in these countries over the 
same period. He concludes that outward orientation has a statistically significant impact on grow1h, 
w1th the most open countries having a per capita growth rate of 2.9% while the most closed ones had 
an average grow1h rate of -1.3%. The author also estimates that if Africa and Latin America were to 
shift to Asian levels of outward orientation, then their per capita grow1h rates would increase by 2.1 
and 1.5 percentages points respectively. 
Neuhaus (2005) argues that more trade boosts grow1h as economies gain from international 
exchange of ideas. He further concludes that stiffer competition that comes with international trade 
results in ever improving production processes and products. The paper highlights multifarious 
channels through which openness feeds through to growth, the main ones being technology transfer 
and improvement in institutional frameworks. 
Frankel and Romer (1999:391) claim that specialization according to comparative advantage, 
exploitation of increasing returns from larger markets, eXChange of ideas through communication and 
travel, and spread of technology through investment and exposure to new goods are some of the 
channels through which trade positively affects income. Controlling for endogeneity of trade w1th 
geographical variables, the authors found a large and robust positive effect. This result was found to 
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be consistent across different samples and specifications, hence bolstering the case for the 
importance of trade and trade-promoting policies. 
Alcala and Ciccone (2004) argue that trade works through labour efficiency to positively affect 
productivity. The main argument of their paper is that use of the wrong measure of trade in existing 
empirical literature results in the underestimation of the productivity gains from openness. Most of the 
literature measures trade by nominal imports plus exports relative to nominal GOP (Alcala and 
Ciccone 2004:613). In contrast, Alcala and Ciccone measure trade by constructing and estimating 
variables for real openness and tradable GOP openness, defined as 'imports plus exports in 
exchange rate US$ relative to GOP in purchasing-power-parity US$ (PPP GOP), and nominal imports 
plus exports divided by the nominal value of production in the tradable goods sector' respectively. 
They found the impact of intemational trade on labour productivity and income per capita at the 
country level to be highly significant and very robust. 
Baldwin's (2003) survey of empirical literature notes disagreement among economists on the 
openness-grow1h debate due to differences in the definition and measurement of these ideas. Also 
contributing to the disagreement is the problem of causation, which has been found to be ambiguous; 
the positive relationship between openness and grow1h holds only under certain conditions 
(Grossman and Helpman 1990 & 1991; Rodrik 1999). 
Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) criticise the consensus that trade reforms led to faster grow1h by 
identifying methodological faults in the five most representative empirical studies of the impact of 
trade openness on grow1h (Dollar, 1992; Ben-David, 1993; Sachs and Warner, 1995; Edwards, 1998; 
and Frankel and Romer, 1999). In particular,Rodriguez and Rodrik heavily criticiseSachs and 
Warner's trade openness index, arguing that the components which most significantly determine its 
positive relation with grow1h (socialist system, exchange rate distortion, and exports marketing 
boards), may be capturing the impact of other non trade-related policies. For instance, the authors 
argue that that the socialist system component is clearly associated with many other policies not 
related to trade. Furthermore, the index relies on subjective weighting of highly imperfect measures 
of trade restrictiveness.Since Rodriguez and Rodrik'scritique, empirical attempts to capture the effect 
of trade liberalization on economic growth have faced the challenge of finding a proxy for trade policy 
openness that is robust against it.For instance, Dollar and Kraay (2002) concur with Rodrigiez and 
Rodrik that measures used for trade openness in the empirical literature are imperfect, and employ 
decade-over-decade changes in the volume of trade as an imperfect proxy for changes in trade 
policy. 
Despite, the debate around measurement of openness, the argument that trade drives economiC 
growth has motivated many developing countries since the 1980s to undertake trade reforms, 
reducing both tariff and non-tariff trade barriers, in order to increase international trade. Recently the 
focus has additionally been on trade-related capacity building with the broad objective of integrating 
developing countries into the multilateral trading system. In the previous chapter we empirically 
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evaluated the effects of the intended outcomes ofTRCB policies on bilateral trade flows. In this 
chapter we go a step further and evaluate trade-growth models, arguing that the standard models are 
inadequate to accommodate complexities associated with interrelationships among conditions for 
growth which require complementary trade policy. We then make suggestions as to how these 
models could be modified andlor extended to allow for an analysis of the impacts of different TRCB 
policy options on overall development. 
14.2.3 Tr;;j~:G;:(;\~tl; lheo~~ti;;'I-Mud~L------' 
Technological innovation is one of the standard recognized channels through which trade affect 
growth. The empirical literature has recently relied on the endogenous growth model to investigate 
this link between trade and growth, with studies including trade factors in otherwise typical production 
functions. A key feature of these endogenous growth models is that they are capable of generating 
ongoing growth in the absence of population growth, implying that long-run national growth rates are 
in general sensitive to national characteristics such as tastes, technology and tax structure. This 
feature of the model makes it possible to analyze the impact of trade policies on long-run equilibrium 
growth rates. 
Trying to find a model that adequately analyses the impact ofTRCB initiatives is not straightforward, 
given that these issues are not trade or growth issues per se but span across two strands of literature. 
An emphasis of the thesis is how TRCB influences growth, both through trade and directly. In what 
follows, we explore these two routes using Barro's (1990) model, which emphasises the 
directrelationship between growth and the variables stimulated by TRCB;and Grossman & Helpman's 
(1991)'s model ofthe relationship between growth and trade. The approach adopted has been to look 
at independent growth and trade theoretical models with the aim of integrating them in such a way 
that they can be used to generalize the empirical findings discussed in the previous chapter. The 
paragraphs below present Grossman-Helpman and Barro models followed by a discussion of their 
implications in the subsequent section. 
Grossman - Helpman (1991) Model 
Grossman and Helpman (1991) provide an analysis linking long-run growth to trade policies. In an 
earlier (1990) study, Grossman and Helpman argue that most prior research on trade and growth set 
in a neoclassical framework neglected the effects of trade structures on growth rates. Additionally, 
the paper argues that traditional trade-growth literature identifies level effects but no rate effects. The 
authors then develop a theoretical framework Which introduces technological innovation, and argue 
that trade affects long-run growth rate through its impact on the stock of knowledge (ibid 1991). They 
model an endogenous rate of long-run growth that relates trade and growth through diffusion of 
technology and knowledge. They argue that a full understanding of growth has to consider the 
accumulation of knowledge and scale economies. 
Technological progress is modelled as endogenous, resulting from profit maximising behaviour of 
entrepreneurs investing in research and development and as exhibiting constant return to scale. The 
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productivity of the local employees engaging in R&D depends on the stock of knowledge capital in the 
country, which in turn is influenced by contacts between local agents and international business 
communities. An increase in bilateral trade is assumed to increase commercial exchange, thereby 
increasing stock of knowledge capital. The intuition is that the more interactions between domestic 
and foreign agents the more access is gained to accumulated knowledge and new discoveries taking 
place in the intemational markets. This contact with the intemational markets facilitates spillover 
benefits for the domestic economy. Hence, in the Grossman and Helpman model this diffusion of 
technology and knowledge relates endogenous rate of long-run growth and trade. 
The model has the following underlying assumptions; a small economy with labour as a single factor; 
two products Y and Z are consumed but only Y is produced in the economy by perfectly competitive 
firms using labour and a continuum of differentiated intermediate products. Total factor productivity 
increases with the number of available differentiated inputs. The underlying hypothesis informing this 
assumption is that exchange of intangible ideas is facilitated by international trade in tangible 
commodities. This implies that trade policy that seeks to promote bilateral trade, e.g. trade-related 
capacity development initiatives, will increase commercial exchange, thereby increasing the stock of 
knowledge capital, accelerating technical progress, and raising grow of the economy. This link gives 
a direct channel through which trade feeds through to growth. 
In the traditional trade-growth literature it was assumed that international spillovers are automatic and 
instantaneous, in symmetry with the treatment of local spillovers, thus neglecting the process through 
which these spillovers take place. The production process makes use of labour and intermediate 
inputs, with each unit of intermediate input requiring one unit of labour, implying that its marginal cost 
equals the wage rate (Me = w). Furthermore, the model assumes constant elasticity of substitution 
w 
between varieties such that px = -. The underlying production function for good Y is as follows: 
a 
Equation 20 
where Ly denotes the employment of the final-goods sector, and X is the total quantity of 
intermediates used. Assuming a constant intersectoral allocation of labour, Y is envisaged to grow at 
the rate gf3(l- a) I a, wihere g" ill n is the rate at which new varieties of intermediates are 
introduced into the economy. The authors show that an increase in the number of varieties of middle 
products raises total factor productivity (TFP). Variety growth stems from the stock of knowledge 
capital K, wihich accumulates in two ways -firstly through new discoveries by researchers, and 
secondly through commercial interaction between domestic and foreign agents. It is assumed that 
the volume of bilateral trade increases the extent of spillovers between the two countries such that 
K(t) = F[n(t),T(t)J; where T(t) is the cumulative volume of trade at time t and net) is the 
Page 100 of 153 
number of varieties available at t. Assuming constant returns to scale the production function of 
knowledge takes the following expression: 
Equation 21 
K = n¢(T / n), ¢>o 
Where et) is the spillover function. It is assumed that there is freedom of entry in R&D such that the 
marginal product and marginal cost of research are equal and in addition the authors impose a 'no-
arbitrage' condition which implies the following relationship: 
Equation 22 
(1- a)X ¢/ aa + if' jw - kj K = r ; where r is the instantaneous rate of interest on consumption 
loans. 
The model also assumes the existence of a household whose members seek to maximize 
intertemporal utility such that future consumption is discounted at rate p . At the steady state and 
assuming a balanced budget, the rate of change of expenditure (r - p), which is assumed to be 
equal to the growth rate of output (gp(l-a))/a, wages will also grow at the same rate. 
Grossman and Helpman (1991 :521) argue that when ¢ approaches a constant, the rate of growth of 
knowledge capital converges on g. Therefore, the steady state (Equation 22) reduces to: 
Equation 23 
(l-a)Xr/J/aa=g+p 
The growth equation boils down to: 
g=(I-a)Xr/J/aa-p 
Assuming that in the steady state consumption growth is equal to output growth, trade volume is 
. gp(l-a) 
assumed to grow at the same rate, such that T / T = . Hence, the size of a relative to 
a 
p(I- a) will determine whether Tin will shrink, grow without bound, or converge to a constant in 
the long run. Considering the first possibility, a> P(l- a) implies declining importance of 
international trade spillovers as a source of domestic knowledge capital, offering a negligible 
contribution to K compared to contribution by local research. The second possibility considered is 
when a < P(l- a) . This occurs when the ratio of trade volume to the number of varieties tends to 
infinity, Tin -> oc ; the implication of this is that international trade spillovers will continue to drive 
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growth in the long run. The last possibility is when a = P(l- a) . In this case both the volume of 
trade and number of varieties grow at the same rate g. The model highlights two main ways in which 
g would change: first through an exogenous change in ¢, and secondly through change in the tariff 
rate. These conditions highlighted in the Grossman - Helpman model are important in particular to 
the SSA region in which most countries are not yet the steady state. Even in the case where trade is 
assumed not to playa part in long-run growth, it will still be welfare enhancing, as policies that expand 
the level of trade increase the convergence to steady state. As such, TRCB will play an important 
role in this model, given its impact on trade. 
The Barro Model 
In this section, I briefly highlight the Barro (1990) model, which explained long-run economic growth 
by incorporating productive govemment expenditure, in a simple endogenous growth model. Barro 
(1990:S103) notes that "recent models of economic growth could generate long-run growth without 
relying on exogenous changes in technology or population". One such model is the Ramsey-Cass-
Koopmans model that extends the Solow growth model by including optimising households and firms. 
Because of its simplicity this model provides a benchmark for endogenous growth models. The 
model assumes competitive firms that rent capital and hire labour to produce and sell output, a 
constant population and an infinitely lived representative household that supplies labour, holds capital, 
consumes and saves. According to Romer (2001), this model, which was developed by Ramsey 
(1928), Cass (1965) and Koopmans (1965), avoids all market imperfections and all issues raised by 
heterogeneous households and intergenerational linkages. Evolution of capital in this model is 
derived from the interaction of optimising households and firms operating in a competitive 
environment. Barro (1990) extended these growth models to include public services and policies that 
affect production and utility. In his analysis, he incorporates a public sector into a simple, constant-
returns model of economic growth. 
We follow this approach, and make an assumption that TRCB initiatives are purely provided from 
public resources. Assume that each household-producer has access to the following two-factor Cobb-
Douglas production function: 
Equation 24 
Y=F(K,AL) 
Now incorporating a public sector, the augmented production can be specified as: 
Equation 25 
Y = F(K,AL,Kg) = (Kg)a(AL)p K'-a-P ,a,j3 E (0,1) 
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where Y denotes output, A > 0 the level of technology, Kg is the quantity of public services, K is 
an inclusive measure of private capital, and AL is effective labour. Barro assumes that the 
production function exhibits constant returns to scale in all factors of production. The general idea of 
including Kg as a separate argument of the production function is that private inputs, as represented 
by K and L are not a close substitute for public inputs. Normally production factors are gross 
complements. A higher stock of public capital in infrastructure, for instance, would tend to raise the 
productivity of other inputs, such as labour and the stock of private capital, thereby reducing un~ 
production costs (Agenor and Moreno-Dodson 2006; Blejer and Khan 1984b). 
From Equation 25 we derivethe marginal products of K and AL to be , respectively, 
Equation 26 
Oy/Ok = (I-a - j3)(Kg, / K)"(L/ K)P > 0; and or /oAL = j3(K g / K)U(K / AL)'-P > 0. 
This result shows that a higher stock of public capital (relative to private capital) increases the 
marginal product of both inputs - although it does so at a decreasing rate, given that a < 1 (Agenor 
and Moreno-Dodson 2006). This is a direct productivity effect of public capital that is commonly 
proposed to account for a growth effect of public capital. Agenor and Moreno-Dodson (2006) note 
that this positive effect of public capital on marginal productivity holds even for other components of 
public spending related to property rights and maintenance of public order, despite the fact that they 
may not be considered as being directly productive. 
Normalising the population size to unity, the production function becomes 
Equation 27 
Y = (Kg)U(A)P K,-u-P,a,j3 E (0,1) 
such that Oy / Ok = (1- a - j3)(Kg; / K)" (A / K)P > ° 
Assuming that a representative infinitely-lived household seeks to optimise the following utility 
function: 
Equation 28 
where c is consumption per worker, and p is the subjective discount rate, the greater the value of p , 
the less the household values future consumption relative to current consumption. Population, which 
corresponds to the number of workers and consumers, is constant. The individual worker's util~y 
functionused is of the following form: 
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Equation 29 
C 1- u -J 
u(C) = , 
1-0" 
where - 0" is the constant elasticity of marginal utility with respect to consumption (a > 0). 
Empirically it has been shown that the relevant case for developing countries is a < 1 (Agenor 2006). 
We assume that the government maintains a balanced budget, and that government expenditure is 
financed contemporaneously by a flat-rate income tax plus some resources from outside, such that, 
Equation 30 
K = T = n, + F = rAK a I! K'-a-' + F g 'l g 
where T is the government's total revenue, ,E (0,1) is the tax rate, and F are resources made 
available to government for development activnies which are exogenous and non-distortional and 
cannot be used for current government consumption but only for development activities. We further 
assume that even if F is zero the government should be able to provide these activities; this is in line 
with the sustainability policy emphasised under donor funded programmes. Under that assumption, F 
can be equated to zero, and we can still evaluate consequences of a trade-related capacity building 
programme, by assuming that it has been financed from internal government resources. 
The objective of the representative household is to maximise lifetime utility subject to the budget 







where for simplicity we assume zero depreciation. 
Setting up the Langragian and solving it shows that the rate of growth of consumption at each point in 
time is given by; 
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Equation 32 
:. = J..- U·-p ) 
c a 
where f' is the marginal product of private capital. With the presence of a flat-rate income tax the 
return to private capital is (1- r)OY / oK. Combining equation (6) and equation (32) we rewrite 
equation (11) as: 
Equation 12a 
~ 1 [ (Kg)"(A)P ] ;= a (l-r)(l-a-p) K K -p 
In this model we assume that the economy is always at a position of steady state growth whereby all 
variables. consumption and stocks of private and public capital and output grow at the same constant 
rate r . Then we can rewrite equation (6a) as follows; 
Equation 12b 
From the above equation we can see that an increase in r reduces the growth rate, r . 
Equation 33 
Set (1- a - fJ) equal to ~ then 
Equation 33a 
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=!(sr/Kg) - !(SY/K.)K. 
" " y 
Iff 15Y / 15K, > 11 K" where 1] K, is elasticity of output with respect to public expenditure. 
The implication of the above result is that Kg < Y i.e. 
K 
-g E (0,1) for public investment to have a 
Y 
growth effect on output. Large public expenditure will generate desirable positive impact on output if 
the level of income is sufficiently high relative to public service outlays. Large investments in public 
services may therefore require concomitant measures to improve economic performance. An 
implication of this finding is that increase in public expenditure alone will increase output up to a 
certain point, but thereafter the increase will be marginal or zero. 
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14,2,4 Implicatiuns of Empirical Findings on the Trade Growth Model 
The main contribution here is how complementarity ofTRCBvariables enhances the growth impact - a 
focus not addressed in the Grossman and Helpman model. The two models reviewed above make it 
possible to extend our analysis to introduce TRCB initiatives. First, Grossman and Helpman's model 
links trade and growth through diffusion of technology and knowledge. In the model, accumulation of 
knowledge is a function of trade volume and the number of varieties such that K = ntf>(T IrI), where 
T is the cumulative volume of trade as noted above. The basic argument advanced by Grossman 
and Helpman is that creation of new varieties, which is essential for economic growth, is an interactive 
leaming process that involves interaction ofboth domestic and foreign actors. According to the model 
the commercial interactions, which are enhanced by volumes of bilateral trade, increase the 
knowledge capital base and result in increased economic growth. It is this link between the 
knowledge capital base and the volume of bilateral trade established in the Grossman and Helpman 
model that allows us to extend our analysis to introduce TRCB. Given the important role played by 
trade in the model it is not farfetched to expect a focus or discussion within the model on how to 
enhance it. The model, however, makes an implicit assumption that capacity exists in the 
firm/economy to optimally engage in international trade - an assumption underlying standard trade 
models. This is in sharp contrast with some literature that has registered discontent with these 
traditional trade theories (Leontief 1947, Linder 1961, Bardhan 1992, Trefler 1993 and 1995, CEPR 
1994, Leamer 1984). Review of literature show that removal of trade barriers does not necessarily 
increase flows unless other capacity constraints are removed. For instance, poor quality of 
infrastructure and institutional divergence have been noted to directly and indirectly increase trade 
costs, resulting in reduced intra and inter regional trade. Therefore, removal of tariffs (as in the 
Grossman - Helpman model) will not enhance growth if trade is constraints by infrastructure, poor 
institutions or human capital. The importance of these other factors in enhancing trade provides a 
direct link between TRCB initiatives and long-run growth in Grossman - Helpman framework - allowing 
us to relate TRCB and output directly; any policy initiative that affects volume of trade flows will have 
a direct impact on the knowledge capital base (K) and enhance economic growth. 
From our empirical analysis we find that TRCB increases bilateral trade flows among trading partners; 
in particular TRCB policy complementarity gives the highest boost to bilateral trade flows. According 
to the Grossman and Helpman model,increased trade will enhance knowledge capital accumulation. 
Therefore, taking into account findings in the previous chapterin which we established a strong 
relationship between bilateral trade flows (T) and trade-related capacity building in institutions, human 
capital and infrastructure,we can modify the Grossman and Helpman model. The function 
K = ro.<I>(T/n)can be re-specified to be a function ofTRCB initiatives; taking into account the 
empirically established relationship between TRCB and trade Tit) = w(l, H, F, cp) where I, H, F and 
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IjJ are institutions, human capital, infrastructure and other variables as defined in the preceding 
chapter. 
Now tuming to the Barro (1990) model, from the earlier discussion the normalised augmented Barra 
production function is as follows: 
Y;(K,)"(A)PK'-"-P,a,pE(O,I). 
where, Y denotes output, A > 0 the level of technology, Kgis the quantity of public services, and K 
is an inclusive measure of private capital. Unlike the Grossman and Helpman model, Barro's does not 
explicitly include channels relating TRCB variables, trade and growth. There is need therefore, to 
develop a theoretical argument that can account for TRCB in the endogenous growth model. 
TRCB can enter the model in two ways. The first way is through its impact On trade and then level of 
technology (A). It has been widely argued that openness to intemational trade is one channel through 
which new technologies (knowledge) flow from abroad (Fagerberg et al. 2009; Ben-David 2002; Coe, 
Helpman and Hoffmaister 1997). Grossman and Helpman (1991:520) also make the argument that 
interaction with the outside world gives access to knowledge (new wisdom and discoveries). 
According to this perspective, new technologies that emerge in developed economies could gradually 
diffuse to the developing world and close the development gap between rich and poor economies 
(Fagerberg et al. 2009). 
To represent a second channel, TRCB could be modelled directly into the Barro model by assuming 
that investment in TRCB (K,) has strong public good properties. Endogenous growth 
modelsincorporate other factors into the production function by assuming the existence of either 
spillovers or increasing returns, as when accumUlation of an intended input has an unintended 
positive effect on productivity, e.g. through the leaming by doing mechanism noted by Arrow (1962). 
This assumptionof spillovers and increasing retums seems plausible in application toTRCB policy 
target variables; given the public good nature of many of these investments (especially those in 
education and institutions). As noted before, TRCBis typically concentrated on human capital, andlor 
institutional and infrastructural capacity development. Impnovement of trade-related infrastructure, 
institutions, andlor human capital will not only benefit the targeted sector but other sectors of the 
economy in general. ConSider, for example, a TRCB policy option that promotes investment in the 
development of ports, road networks, internet access, or telephone services to facilitate trade. Though 
the primary objective is to increase participation on the world market, such investment is not specific 
to traded sectors but benefitsproducers throughout the economy. Unless there are proper legal policy 
guidelines in place to ensure that the private sector will recoup their investments in such activities; 
these kind of investments are done by national governments, sometimes with support from 
intemational organisations. An important characteristic of modem infrastructure is the fact that 
services are often supplied through a networked delivery system designed to serve a mu~itude of 
users (Agenor and Neanidis 2006). Therefore, trade-related infrastructure development will reduce 
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production costs, through reduction of transport and information costs. Better infrastructure and lower 
transport cost will first and foremost increase trade volumes, but will also increase total factor 
productivity. This is a direct impact ofTRCB on growth. De Mello (1997) noted that the adequacy of 
basic infrastructure affects the attractiveness of a country, thereby potentially increasingforeign direct 
Investment". Therefore, if the govemment embarks on trade-related infrastructural development, the 
benefits will spill over to other sectors of the economy.TRCB policy target variables are typically non-
rivalrous and partially non-excludable in nature, implying that the development of infrastructure, 
institutions and human capital to boost trade has spillover benefits to non-trade sectors of the 
economy and hence directlypromote overall growth. 
Based on this assumed 'public good' character ofinvestments in TRCB, we therefore further assume 
that Government is committed to make the optimal use ofTRCB resources. Specifically, we suppose 
that there is deliberate public investment coordination that hinges upon the TRCB policy such that 
public services/policy (Kg) is equivalent to investments in TRCB (KT)' In Chapter 3 we saw that 
where X is intemational bilateral trade flows as measured by exports,!( T is investment in TRCB and " 
are other factors that affect international bilateral trade flows, as identified in the previous chapter, and 
KT = wi!, H, F) 
where I, Hand F are institutions, human capital and infrastructure variables as defined previously. 
Incorporating this relationship into the output equation as identified by Barro when public investment 
is included (see Equation 25)we will have the following: 
Equation 34 
Therefore the impact ofTRCB investments on output is through its impact on exports as shown in 
Chapter 3, such that sY = ~' , ~x. But TRCB consists of many different activities as highlighted in 
oKr oX OKr 
the overview ofTRCB, implying that the impact ofKr on output might be due to improvement in 
exports as a resu~ of capacity development in human capital, institutions or infrastructureas follows: 
c1Y c1Y oX .. t f' . . I . d I - = - '-: Partlallmpac a Instltutlona capacity eve opment 
61 oX 01 
53 This paper wilt not explore in detail the channels through which infrastructure impacts growth. See Fedderke (2005), 
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8Y 8Y ax 
-;- = -, -: Partial impact of capacity development of human capital. 
aH oX oR 
?' = lIY ,
II
I1X: Partial impact of infrastructural development. 
of 6X F 
Furthermore, our empirical results show that it is not the partial impact ofTRCS initiatives that matters 
most, but the complementarities among TRCS activities. The results show that full benefits of capacity 
building on trade are realized when implementation of different policies is done in parallel, though not 
necessarily when I, H, and F are provided at a ratio of 1: 1: 1. In that case, we are interested in the 
following cross partial derivatives of the augmented production function: 
6 2 y BY ex ox 
-- = ...:... , -. -: the rate of change of output with respect to improvement in trade-related 
BilH 8x 8: 81/ 
institutions given that trade-related human capital also improves; 
8 2 y 8"1 8x 8Y. 
GloF = 8x • 8i' 8F : the rate of change of output with respect to capacity improvement in trade-
related institutions given that trade-related infrastructure also improves; 
11'1' 51' IIx IIx 
8F6H = 5x ' SF . 8H : the rate of change of output with respect to upgrading of trade-related 
infrastructure given that trade-related human capital also improves; 
Where; 
o'Y 6'2y e2y o2y 6'2y 6'2y 
M6'H = oHM; 6'£6'1 = lI6'F; 6'F6'H = lH6'F 
Given that our analysis in the previous chapter suggests that optimizing investment ofTRCS in sub-
Saharan Africa could be achieved by building capacity in all areas in parallel as opposed to adopting 
a single policy option, we infer that; 
IiY (.21' Ii'\' iiV' Ii'Y (:'1' If\' Ii'\' S'Y 
Sf < {)foH or oHOf; oH < 5Ho!' or o.'fCiI· and 5F < SF{j.'f or oH8F 
The intuition ofthis empirical findings is that while marginal effects are important it is the second order 
effect (complementarity) that is more important. These relationships are in line with the data, which 
reveal that Africa lags behind other regions in all TRCS target variables, implying that there is need to 
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build capacity in each. According to Lipsey and Lancaster (1956) adopting a piecemeal reform 
approach may reduce welfare if there are a large number of distortions, as is the case in SSA. 
Hence, the notion of policy complementarity is based on the proposition that lack of progress in one 
area affects grow1h - for example upgrading trade-related infrastructure is undermined in the absence 
of good institutions or human capital. Therefore complementary investment policies should result in 
higher output. Building capacity in one area increases the return from implementing improvement in 
another. Our findings suggest a broader capacity building programme which is comprehensive in 
nature. 
14.2.4.1 Proposed modi[icationjextensiotl of the standard growth model 
While either the Grossman and Helpman or Barro models could be extended to analyse the impact 
ofTRCB on grow1h, Barro's framework is preferred because its incorporation of a public sector into a 
simple constant-returns model of grow1h seems most appropriate for exploring the impact ofTRCB 
initiatives. TRCB initiatives are mainly implemented on the national level by government, through 
technical cooperation with foreign agencies or governments (as part of development aid). We make 
the following three major assumptions as a basis of our analysis; (i) Govemment is committed to 
make the optimal use ofTRCB resources (ii) there is a deliberate public investment coordination 
aimed at promoting trade through trade-related investment, such that public services/policy (Kg) is 
equivalent to investments in TRCB (KT }and (iii) TRCB is an efficient form of development assistance 
(meaning that it should be supplying inputs of a type that a rational public sector would supply if it had 
the means). 
Inclusion of trade-related investment introduces complexity to the existing endogenous model as 
extensions have to be added in the specification of the functional form of public investment. The 
Cobb-Douglas functional form adopted by Barro (1990) assumes that inputs are highly substttutable 
for each other and limits the substitution elasticities to unity; hence it allows room for input resources 
to be concentrated on cheaper investments at the expense of other forms of investment. Allowing for 
such substitutability contradicts the empirical findings of this thesis, which emphasise the importance 
of complementarity. Furthermore, the results show varying optimal complementarities across regions, 
with SSA countries benefiting more from complementing human capital and infrastructure while non-
SSA countries derive their highest benefit from complementary institutional and infrastructural 
investments. In addition, data in this thesis show a wide variation between SSA and non-SSA 
average TRCB values and world standards. In such circumstances there is no reason to expect that 
the elasticity of substitution between different combinations ofTRCB variables will be same across 
regions. Therefore assuming elastiCity of substitution to be unity is restrictive for TRCB analysis since 
we expect that the substitutability between two variables, e.g.Hand/, is different from that between H 
and F. 
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In addition, the Barro model focuses on the overall size of govemment expenditure irrespective of 
composition. As such the framework does not allow an investigation into the optimal balance between 
different potential investment decisions by the government. However, our findings indicate that 
investment mixes among sub-components matter for TRCB effectiveness. Furthermore, we must 
recognize that the government can invest in either trade-related or non-trade related activities, and 
different mixes will have different consequences for trade and hence output. These insights coming 
from the empirical resuHs are not limited to trade flows only but should also apply to a standard 
growth model. However, such complexities cause inconvenience to these standard theoretical 
models which represent only highly stylized general relationships. However, Davies and Weinstein 
argue that such inconveniencies for theories should not be ignored but should be embraced and 
understood. Arrow et al. (1961) and other researchers questioned the restrictive nature of the Cobb-
Douglas model in assuming that all elasticities are equal to 1 and developed other flexible functions 
that allow substitution to be unrestricted (Berndt & Christensen 1973; Christensen et al. 1975; Deaton 
& Muellbauer 1980b; Deaton 1983; and Jorgensonand Fraumeni1983 among others). This, according 
to Guilkey and Lovell (1980:137) leaves separability, substitution and scale behaviour as hypotheses 
to be tested rather than maintained. 
In the next paragraphs, we consider modifications to the model that can accommodate our estimation 
findings. The empirical evidence presented in Chapter 3 shows that the elasticity of substitution 
among the TRCB target variables is not one. If unity elasticity of substitution held then the degree of 
substitutability between inputs would not change regardless of the level of output or input proportions 
(Jehle & Reny 2001 :122). This does not characterize the data analyzed in Chapter 3, which comes 
from countries at different levels of development, or our empirical findings, which imply different TRCB 
target variable elasticities. We therefore propose a flexible functional form that allows different 
substitution possibilities. In particular, we speCify public investment using a constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES)-transcendental logarithmic (Translog) function as suggested by Polack, Sickles 
and Wales (1984). CES-Translog is a nested functional fornn that combines constant elasticity of 
substitution and transcendental logarithmic functional fornns, and is therefore compatible with a wider 
range of substitution possibilities than either the CES or the translog individually (Polack, Sickles and 
Wales1984:602). 
Taking the estimation equation for a CES-translog function proposed by Dewan and Min (1996) and 
changing the notation to be in line with that which we have used above, public trade-related 




p +CTrF-P +(l-CT. -CTr)rp)+w .. (logH)' 
p 
+ wff (log F)' + lOu (log!)' + w.r (logH)(logF) + w., (log H)(log !) 
+ lOft (logF)(logJ) + Ii 




H, F and I are human capital, infrastructure and institutions. 
Kg is the trade-related investment; 
p = 1(lIB); that is, B = 11(1- p) where B is the elasticity of substitution which lies between 
Oand <n. 
As p~-oo,B~O when B=l,p=O andwhenB~oo,p~+1 
CES, trans log and Cobb-Douglas functions are all special cases under the CES-translog functional 
form". 
The first order derivatives of the function are given by: 
Equation 36 
I' = K. h +-logF +----.!!'-logJ +~logH . 
[
cr H-p-l OJh} OJ 20J ] 
Jh g Z H H H ' 
[ 
F -p-l 2 J (j . {J)h ({) . OJ 
if = Kg} +-' logH +~logJ +-JJ- logF ; 
Z F F F 
1: = K ' + ----.!!'-Iog H + -' log F + --" log J 
[
cr rp-l OJ OJh 20J ] 
, g Z J J J 
Adoption of such a functional form has implications for the steady-state values, depending on the 
values of p and the quadratic terms, which are cross partials between variables (capturing 
complementarity ofTRCB policy mixes). Given that our empirical analysis in the previous section 
shows that full benefits of capacity building are realized when different policies are implemented in 
parallel, there is no reason to assume that the quadratic terms will be negative or zero. As such the 
partial impact of trade-related investment will be enhanced. Implication of this conclusion is a higher 
steady-state growth rate as a result of a change on Kg. From Equation 33a we saw that: 
Adopting a specification that takes into account policy dynamics and assumptions regarding 
SUbstitutability among TRCB investments will resu~ in a higher bY /oKg and hence a higher steady 
state growth (8y / OK,) than what the standard endogenous growth models would reveal. 
54 ~In particular, when all the quadratic terms are zero we obtain the CES production function, while the translog production 
function is obtained in the limit as p ---+ O' (Dewan and Min, 1996:8). 
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All of this means that there is need to find the optimum kinds and quantities ofTRCB activities. 
Therefore, the social planner needs to optimise investments in TRCB(KT ) by combining I,H,F in 
a particular manner, and to maximise K T subject to the cost being equal to tax income revenue (T) 
as follows: 
MaxKT 
stPHH +PJ+PFF =T 
Introducing this optimisation dimension in TRCB analysis gives insight into why TRCB may not bring 
about the anticipated growth. Once the optimisation problem is factored into the analysis, the steady-
state growth rate becomes a function of the prices ofTRCB elements. It therefore means that, if one 
form ofTRCB is prohibitively expensive, the ability of the govemment to raise economic growth 
through TRCB investment may be curtailed because TRCB elements jointly matter in promoting trade 
flows and hence growth - but government cannot substitute the expensive elements for the cheaper 
ones. 
4.3 CONCLUSION 
The trade-growth theoretical framework needs to condition on trade policy dynamics. If there are no 
constraints on trade-related capacity building policies that could be adopted it is possible that the 
value of bilateral trade flows may be higher in the status quo without TRCB than under a TRCB 
programme, and growth will actually fall due to TRCB initiatives. For example, according to our 
findings, focusing all attention on the improvement of institutions alone will not result in increased 
trade flows, either in the region or in other non-SSA countries. Thus such investment resources would 
be wasted and we would expect this opportunity cost to be reflected in reduced growth. Our empirical 
findings substantiate the view that trade positively affects growth only if the right combination of trade-
related capacity building policies is adopted. This therefore implies that if the optimal mix is not 
balanced, trade-related initiatives will not yield the maximum benefits. More worryingly, net benefits 
could be zero or negative. 
This is potentially enlightening for debates on the value of openness, which have been characterized 
by disagreement regarding the overall impact of trade on growth. Given that Africa lags behind in all 
TRCB target variables, it is possible that ratios are not appropiately balanced. This might explain why 
in our regression results reported in the previous chapter the African dummy is consistently negative 
and significant. Bilateral trade flows in sub-Saharan African might be constrained by inappropriate 
combinations of trade-related and general private investment mixes. 
Therefore, analyzing the impact of trade policy in general using the standard endogenous growth 
framework might underestimate the impact since policy dynamics are not addressed in the 
framework. This could the reason for the existence of ambiguities that have been noticed in the trade-
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growth empirical literature. For example, a focus on primary exports might entail improvements in 
infrastructure at the expense of human capital and institutions, resulting in losing the complementarity 
necessary to attain higher growth. 
In addition to incorporating policy complementarities, the standard growth model could be modified 
and/or extended to incorporate policy coordination. Although the issue of policy coordination is not 
tested in this thesis, it could also be that, by specifying particular investment targets, TRCB serves to 
coordinate investments across agencies, government departments and private agents; and this could 
provide an additional, or indeed even primary, channel by which it has positive impact on growth. 
Once TRCB initiatives are adopted trade becomes the focus as a tool for development; hence even 
non-trade related investment will switch to tradable products as the economy opens. In the debate 
on policy coordination, it is noted that public investment coordination centres on common policy and 
institutional frameworks among others. In the standard endogenous growth model policy coordination 
plays no role in determining the long-run growth rate of income. Hence the model is inadequate to fully 
analyze the impact ofTRCB. 
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CHAPTERS 
CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY OPTIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This thesis investigates the opportunity costs oITRCB policy mixes in SSA The research is motivated 
by the fact that development resources flowing to Africa are scarce; therefore, their allocation should 
be prioritized in such a way as to yield the greatest benefits. The thesis set out to find the optimal 
allocation oITRCB resources and their opportunity costs in terms of trade flows and growth. Interview 
with trade experts in Geneva were done in conjunction with desk study of policy documents in the 
early phase of the thesis write-up to get a fair understanding oITRCB programmes and economic 
rationales that fed into trade-related technical assistance and capacity-building policy. This was followed by an 
empirical analysis offRCB, whose main aim was to find out if the current focus ofTRCB is empirically justified. 
This was done through an estimation of the marginal effects of the three identified TReB activities (human 
capital, infrastructure and institutions) as well as the impact oftheir complementary policy mixes.Policy simulation 
methodology was then used to test the responses of trade flows to different TRCB policy mixes. Lastly, the 
thesis further explores the standard trade and growth models, in particular their ability to provide an adequate 
framework for analYSing the impact offRCB on growth. To be able to use these existing these standard trade 
and growth models I condude by making some specification modifications proposals. 
The interview work and desk study revealed many issues of interest to the optimal allocation oITRCB 
resources. The preceding chapters shed light on the optimal balance of emphasis in TRCB policies 
as amongst infrastructure, institutional promotion and human capital development. H.owever, the 
analysis shows lack of coherence in the implementation oITRCB activities by bilateral and multilateral 
donors - no systematic implementation strategy or identification criteria seem to be in place to guide 
donors globally. 
The main empirical findings are that each TRCB variables matter a lot but policy complementarities 
matter the most in trade-related capacity building initiatives - as such any effort aimed at fully 
understanding the overall impact oITRCB on development should be modelled in a framework that 
takes into account these policy dynamics. In particular, empirical findings highlight the importance of 
taking cognizance of heterogeneity among regions in choosing TRCB policy mixes. Non-SSA 
countries benefit most from mixes of infrastructure and institutions, wihile countries in SSA derive 
maximum benefit from mixes of human capital and infrastructure. An implication of our findings is that 
universalism as an approach to development strategies, and in particular to TRCB, is problematic. If 
a universal approach to TRCB is adopted we are likely to see disappointing results across countries, 
as was the case with the outcomes of 'one size fits all' Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) 
implemented in different regions and conditions of governance. Trade-related capacity building, while 
bearing much promise for sub-Saharan Africa, is unlikely to bring full benefits, and might even do 
harm, without the proper balance of investment targets. As such, the quest for growth in the region 
may remain elusive if the right policy mixes are not established. Based on the review oITRCB activities 
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by different donors it is established that existing TRCB activities do not take into account the 
importance of identifying optimal complementarities. The design and implementation of these 
activities lackseconomic coherence. They are too broad in nature and there is also duplication among 
providersofTRCB activities. 
Based on our empirical findings, an obvious future research challenge is to determine the optimal 
proportional reduction in distortions and capacity building needs. One of the reasons for failure of 
previous development programmes such as SAPs in Africa is the application of uniform development 
strategies across different countries. While this thesis gives insight into the importance of combining 
different policy mixes, it did not go further in establishing the optimal proportions for any given 
country. Therefore, future research may also contribute to this discussion by further investigating 
these optimal proportions of complementarities in different development circumstances. 
In order to improve coordination among donors, further analysis could be done to evaluate which 
TRCB initiatives by different donors yield the greatest positive impacts on trade and growth. For 
example, is human capital development supported by lTC, which targets entrepreneurs, more 
effective than that underwritten by the WTO, which targets government officials? In addition to other 
methods that a researcher may employ, this can also be done using the analytical framework of this 
thesis, by estimating the gravity equation using individual components ofTRCB indices. 
The cost implications ofTRCB policies need to be investigated against their anticipated benefits. Our 
analysis has been too simple in this respect, as we assumed equal costs regardless of the type of 
investment involved. 
Findings in this thesis pose challenges to trade theorists to critically review standard trade and growth 
models with the aim of finding models that can provide an appropriate framework for analyzing 
dynamics surrounding trade policy. Trade-growth model reviewed in this thesis ignores the 
determinants of trade and take it to be exogenous. What we saw from the empirical findings is that 
the policy mixes matter; this therefore calls for more complicated models to analyse non-linear 
relationships that result from policy complementarities. Without the proper conceptual framework of 
analysis that recognises the dynamics necessary for TRCB to yield maximum results, estimated 
marginal effects ofTRCB initiatives will be quite low. 
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Appendix 2: Semi-Structured Questionnaire Used as a Guide During Interviews With Key 
Trade Officials in Geneva, Switzerland 
Thesis aim: To compare the opportunity costs (in terms of growth and trade flows) of various aspects of 
trade-related capacity building (TReB) initiatives. 
Objective of the Questionnaire: To get an understanding of the economic analysis that fed into trade-related 
technical assistance and capacity-building policy, that is, implidt and explicit rationales for specific details of trade 
capacity building programmes 
Results of the Questionnaire: Responses to the interview will be used for background analySis oITRCB and 











Challenge, lack of clear and measurable objectives and indicators in programming documents that have 
guided policy design and implementation. 
From my readings seem to understand that, needs identification (needs gaps) is done (diagnostic study of 
country needs, WTO operations divisions, Trade Policy Review Division); how are the TA activities 
prioritlsed, this not clear in the available documents. How do you decide on one particular TA 
activity Instead of the other? 
If TA is demand-driven as I seem to understand in the documents; how then do you optimise the use of 
resources, given that resources are limited? 
Theoretical underpinning of the policy: Are there some studies (background papers) which were done 
before these TReB programmes to give an economic Justification. Are there some Implicit 
economic model underlying policy targets. "so, which papers are they (accessibility of the 
documents)? 
What is the justification oITRCB activities in the policy literature produced by the responsible agencies and 
their consultants? How much support can these justifications find in economic theory and in academic 
analysis of past and present political economy? 
Type of data available. What kind of baseline data is available, baseline Information (probably linked 
to needs assessment or not) e.g. no. of trade economists, trade lawyers, PhDs etc? (availability of 
such kind of information per country) 
What is the difference between current focus of TRTAICB and previous similar initiatives that addressed 
these capacity constraints (human capital, institutions, and infrastructure)? 
Trade-related capacity building Vs Aid for Trade, where is the difference is it change of focus or what? 
For how long is the IF supposed to go?? Any discussions to that effect taking place?? Any major changes in 
the design foreseen; what guides policy changes -current negotiations? 
Other Issues 
• Other resource persons to contact, 
• Other relevant data sources 
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Appendix 9: Base Model with all TReB Variables (Full Stata Results) 
Heckman selection model -- two-step estimates 
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deacam 5.048952 
dear~com 5.184885 
deefta 1.097898 .3337203 3 .29 0.00: .4438184 l. 751978 
decowas .1366206 .220271 0 .62 0.535 .2951027 .5683439 





deis .0906758 .1956013 o. 46 0.643 -.2926957 .4740473 
dsapta 4.465767 
dsadensacu .7068568 .3355751 2 .11 0.035 .0491418 1.364572 
dsacu -.5530236 .3984211 -1.39 0.165 -1.333915 .2278675 
dbilateral .3338469 .137309 2.43 0 .015 .0647263 .6029675 
- cons I 1.144168 .3109563 3.68 0.000 .5347047 1 .753631 
- - - - - +-
mills 
lambda -.1823425 .1668334 -1.09 0.274 -.50933 .1446451 
- - - - - - - -
rho -0.08543 
sigma 2.1343054 
lambda -.18234245 .1668334 
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Appendix 10: Categorisation of United States Trade Capacity Building Assistance 
Tca by Category ($US) 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Human Capacity Development 
WTO Awareness 8.250.253 9.518.213 8.389.916 6.297.984 6.857.445 4.714.130 
WTO Accession 8.112.957 4.074.503 6.201.026 3.431.274 9.925.264 7.206.694 
mo Agreements (Sum of) 37.572.617 36.325.261 35.088.900 25.012.669 19.858.920 28.248.627 
Agreements on Trade in Goods 2.653.722 1.039.694 671.330 380.349 998.975 837.500 
Agreement on Agriculture 4.105.782 2.186.466 729.950 987.205 1.549.304 781.052 
Agreement on SPS 6.788.308 9.857.882 6.995.360 7.246.468 8.725.989 10.409.348 
Agreement on TBT 4,840,140 4.643.520 4,401.560 1.801.453 1.642.870 3.661.200 
Agreement on TRIMs 1.956.048 330.000 220.070 165.291 10.000 525.000 
Agreement on Anti-Dumping 32.770 703.562 103.680 202.462 30.000 175.000 
Agreement on Customs Valuation Methods 3.462.136 3.974.680 6.651.130 3.014.549 1.000.506 574.000 
Agreement on Rules of Origin 1,459,185 1.211.590 659.070 989.661 802.275 318.000 
Agreement on Import Licensing Proc. 1._.840 383.000 52.230 76.000 151.800 175.000 
Agreement on CVMs 198.440 237,480 236.600 307.850 161.117 175.000 
Agreement on Safeguards 108.400 664.562 149.750 275.027 101.117 175.000 
General Agreement on Trade in Services 3.423.691 1.558.513 3.878.527 1.086.044 1.518.317 2.105.800 
Agreement on TRIPs 3.558.952 6.215.359 7.027.824 4.708.533 1.526.357 6.429.308 
Agreement on Disputes Settlement 258.942 736.100 1.568.210 745.216 378.975 537.000 
Agreement on TPRM 1.508.041 485.000 252.920 219.220 15.000 898.347 
Agreement on Gov't Procurement 1.851.219 1.993.873 1.480.000 2.029.473 696.317 297.071 
Other WTO Agreements 104.000 10.689 777.888 550.000 175.000 
Human Resources & Labor Standards 132.074.621 99.664.527 115.292.905 138.396.841 87.695.235 95.393.488 
Trade-Related Agriculture 41.628.190 84.002.132 104.494.091 114.906.661 164.235.937 132.672.683 
Tourism Sector Development 6.051.892 20.989.283 10.623.252 19.126.614 21.882._ 10.763._ 
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Other Services Development 21,897,831 23,619,182 6,373,076 6,370,782 4,385,429 1,649,733 
Business Services & Training 74.482.426 76,102,461 94.645,233 154.082.156 86.637.788 
Regional Trade Agreements (RTA) 9.449._ 29.262.861 32.741.228 28.684.386 14.362.701 
Su~Total 255,588,361 362,124,975 391,828,488 _,929,286 497,607,456 381,649,726 
Institutional Development 
Trade Facilitation (sum of) 0 61.219.753 91,499.706 127.807.565 143.145.009 193.979.825 
Customs Operation & Administration 19.900.167 21.505.858 31.801.583 17.004.953 67,457,827 
Export Promotion 30.992.468 67,413,517 87.250.531 98.082.827 93.185.225 
Other Trade Facilitation 10.327,118 2.580.331 8.755.451 28.057.229 33.336.773 
Financial Sector Dev. & Good Governance 63.332.344 68.850.959 88.730.327 86,135.648 167.683,650 87.814.732 
Environmental Trade & Standards 34.465.246 19,310.946 28.903.590 29.220.906 29,484,153 63,362.888 
Competition Policy & Foreign Investment 37.038.793 28,667,469 23.901.142 22.824.831 27,480.569 29,440.889 
GovfTransparency & Inter-Agency Coord. 46,158.928 33.358.407 41,907,784 49.383,743 38.313.639 50.120.631 
Other TCB 7,576,435 22,266.038 21.839.261 22,125,464 52,775,117 65.219.114 
SulrTotal 188,571,746 233,673,572 296,781,810 337,498,157 458,882,137 489,938,079 
Infrastructure Development 
Physical Infrastructure Development 43.251.493 19.401.099 44.063.581 119,723.023 346.297,431 549,796.466 
E-Commerce & IT 22,635.501 27.446.566 23.009.965 42,466.015 14.594.579 
SulrTotal 43,251,493 42,036,600 71,510,147 142,732,988 388,763,446 564,391,045 
Grand Total TRCB 487,411,60 637,835,147 760,120,445 921,160,431 1,345,253,039 1,435,978,850 
Source: U.S. Trade Capacity Building Database www.usaid.gov, keyword: TCB Database: (grouping of activities done by the author). 
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